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The paper departs from the standard practice that takes the estimated marginal
effects of either the amount of credit received or membership in a credit program as
measures of the impact of access to credit on household welfare.  The marginal effects of
the formal credit limit variable on household welfare, controlling for the credit limit from
informal sources as well as the credit demanded from both sources, measure the marginal
effects of access to formal credit.  The main finding of the paper is that access to formal
credit, by enabling households to reduce their borrowing from informal sources, has
marginally beneficial effects on household annual income.  However, these effects are very
small and do not cause any significant difference between the per capita incomes, food
security, and nutritional status of credit program members and noncurrent members. 
Moreover, the beneficial substitution effect reflects only the fact that reduced borrowing
from informal sources makes informal loans play a lesser role in the negative impact that
borrowing (from formal or informal sources) has on net crop incomes.  The marginal
effects on household farm and nonfarm incomes resulting from mere access to formal
credit (without necessarily borrowing) are positive and quite sizable, but not statistically
significant.  Land scarcity and unfavorable terms of trade for the smallholders’ farm
products remain by far the factors that most constrain per capita household income growth
in Malawi.  The paper concludes that the necessary complementary resources and
economic environment are not yet in place for access to formal credit to realize its full
benefits for Malawi’s rural population.CONTENTS
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International Food Policy Research Institute1.  INTRODUCTION
The political and financial support currently enjoyed by microcredit programs flows
from the assumption that with improved access to credit poor rural households will be able
to raise their living standards by engaging in more lucrative farm and nonfarm income
activities.  But do households who gain access to credit through microcredit programs
improve their living conditions?  And if so, how much and in what ways do households
and their individual members benefit?  In particular, does access to formal credit
contribute to the food security of the household as a whole and improve the nutritional
status of the children?  Furthermore, because households often have access to informal
sources of credit, how are access to both formal and informal sources of credit related in
their effects on household welfare?  This paper addresses these questions. 
The paper departs from the standard practice that takes the estimated marginal
effects of either the amount of credit received or membership in a credit program as
measures of the impact of access to credit on household welfare.  The shortcomings of this
standard practice have been long recognized (see, for example, David and Meyer 1980;
Feder et al. 1990; Zeller et al. 1996).  They are directly related to the fungibility and
substitutability of credit from different sources and to the endogeneity of credit demand
and membership in credit programs.  Therefore, to assess satisfactorily the effect of access
to credit, this paper makes the distinction between access to credit (formal or informal)2
and participation (in formal credit programs or the informal credit market).  A household
has access to a particular source of credit if it is able to borrow from that source, though it
may choose not to borrow.  The extent of access to credit from a given source is
measured by the maximum amount a household can borrow (credit limit or credit line)
from that source.  A household participates if it borrows from a source of credit.  The
distinction between access and participation is also important because a household may
benefit from mere access to credit even if it does not borrow.  Indeed, with the option of
borrowing, a household can do away with risk-reducing but inefficient income
diversification strategies (Eswaran and Kotwal 1990) and precautionary savings that have
negative returns (Deaton 1989).
The marginal effects on household welfare of the credit limit variable for formal
credit, controlling for the credit limit from informal sources as well as the credit demanded
from both sources, measure the marginal effects of access to formal credit.  Furthermore,
by controlling for both the level of access to credit and the amount of credit demanded
from formal and informal sources, the changes in welfare outcomes due to changes in the
formal credit limit variables can be separated from those due to the substitution effects
that arise when formal and informal credit are substitutable to some degree.  Similarly, the
direct effect of access to credit (that is, the effect of merely having access to formal credit)
is separated from the indirect effect that arises when households exercise their options to
borrow. 3
The methodology described above and data collected in 1995 and 1996 in a three-
round survey of 404 households in 45 villages and five districts of Malawi are used to
assess the marginal impact of access to formal credit on farm and nonfarm incomes,
household food security, and nutritional status in Malawi.  The main finding of the paper is
that access to formal credit has marginally beneficial effects on household annual income
because it enables households to reduce their borrowing from informal sources.  However,
these effects are too small to cause any significant difference between the incomes and
food security of credit program members and noncurrent members.  Moreover, the
beneficial substitution effect reflects the fact that reduced borrowing from informal
sources makes informal loans play a lesser role in the negative effect that borrowing (from
formal or informal sources) has on net crop incomes.
The paper is organized as follows:  section 2 presents the methodology used to
measure access to credit and its effects on household welfare.  Section 3 discusses the
empirical model and estimation issues.  Section 4 presents the empirical results related to
the direct and indirect marginal effects of access to formal credit on farm and nonfarm
incomes, household food security, and nutritional status.  Section 5 offers some final
remarks on the policy implications of the analysis.4
2. MEASUREMENT OF ACCESS TO CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT
ON HOUSEHOLD OUTCOMES
One of the most important policy and research questions regarding credit markets in
developing countries is often posed in terms of how access to credit or its improvement
translates into change in household agricultural output, income, food security, and so on. 
This question is central in many decisions regarding government- and NGO-supported
credit programs, where the economic benefits of providing households access to credit are
often compared to the economic costs of setting up these programs and delivering credit
to the target households.  Therefore, the meaning of the term “access to credit” and its
relation to other often synonymously used credit-related concepts such as credit
constraint, credit demand, and participation should be clarified first, before its impact on
any outcome is assessed.  The next section discusses a methodology based on the credit
limit concept, which allows a precise definition of “access to credit” and enables a more
satisfactory analysis of its impact on household welfare.  (See Diagne, Zeller, and Sharma
1997 for more details on the methodology.) 
CREDIT CONSTRAINT, ACCESS TO CREDIT, AND PARTICIPATION
Any borrower, however credit worthy, faces a limit on the overall amount he or she
can borrow from any given source of credit.  This maximum amount, arising from the
limits to the resources of potential lenders, is independent of the interest rate that can be







the lack of effective contract enforcement mechanisms, lenders have the incentive to
further restrict credit supply even if they have more than enough to meet a given demand
and a borrower is willing to pay a high interest rate (Avery 1981; Stiglitz and Weiss
1981).
The credit limit—the maximum the lender is willing to lend—is referred to here as
 and is the focus of the methodology.  For any potential borrower, the lender’s
optimal choice of  , interpreted here as credit supply, is a function of the maximum
amount the lender is able to lend and a subjective assessment of the likelihood of default
and other borrowers' characteristics.  The lack of access to credit from a given source of
credit can be defined as the   for that source of credit equaling zero.  That is, access to
a certain type of credit exists when   for that type of credit is positive; and access
improves when   for that type of credit increases.
Access to formal credit is often confused with participation in formal credit
programs.  The two concepts are used interchangeably in many credit studies.  The crucial
difference between the two is that households freely choose to participate in a credit
program, but their access to a credit program is constrained by various factors, including
eligibility criteria and availability of credit programs.  In other words, participation is more
of a demand-side issue related to the potential borrower’s choice of the optimal loan size
b , while access is more of a supply-side issue related to the potential lender’s choice of
*




IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF ACCESS
TO CREDIT
If access to credit and improvement in access to credit are identified respectively
with a strictly positive and increasing credit limit, , measuring the impact of access to
credit means measuring the effects of an increase in   on household behavior and
welfare.  This interpretation of the objective of public intervention in the credit market as
one of increasing the credit limit of poor credit-constrained households (instead of actually
giving out credit) has methodological implications.
Most studies on the impact of credit programs on household outcomes take the
effect of an additional unit of credit received by a household as the effect of the credit
program on those households.  What is evaluated in these studies is  , where y is a
household outcome variable (see, for example, Pitt and Khandker 1995).  The hypothesis
being tested is the existence of a positive relationship between credit received and various
household outcomes.  These types of impact studies have been long criticized, notably by
David and Meyer (1980), for reasons related to the problems of substitutability and
fungibility of credit from different sources.  Indeed, the usefulness of such an approach for
policy is limited unless one assumes that all households in the program 1) had credit
constraints when they received credit, 2) had the program as their only source of credit,
and 3) were unable to use their own resources to finance even a part of their investments
(Feder et al. 1990).  However, most households have access to some form of informal
credit and use various saving options to transfer resources across time.  Furthermore, the
different sources of credit and ways of financing investments are likely to be substitutable7
to some degree.  Therefore, the amount of formal credit households demand when such
credit becomes available is likely to reflect some substitution away from other sources of
investment funds.  These substitution effects alone make it inappropriate to identify the
effects of access to formal credit with the effects of changes in the formal loan size, even if
the endogeneity of the latter has been appropriately dealt with.
There are two other reasons why it is inappropriate to use the amount borrowed to
assess the impact of access to formal credit.  First, some households may have access to
sufficient credit lines from the program, but decide not to borrow because it is not optimal
for them to do so.  Yet, the sufficient credit lines provided by the program to these
nonborrowing households may have a positive effect (by allowing these households not to
engage in unproductive precautionary savings, for example).  Emphasis on the amount
borrowed would not account for such an effect.  Second, some households may have
received large amounts of credit with little or no marginal impact on their household
outcomes, because, at that level of credit use, the marginal impact of additional credit
received may be negligible.  But, this negligible impact does not account for the positive
effects of the “shields” provided by the sufficient credit lines that allowed the borrowing of
such large amounts.
The same criticism applies to the other common practice of equating the effects of
membership in a credit program on household welfare with the effects of access to formal
credit.  The wider literature on program evaluation demonstrates that if proper survey
design, sample selection, and econometric analysis resolve the problem of endogeneity of8
This is an incentive repayment device aimed at inducing nonrecipients to put pressure on the
1
recipients to repay their loans.  The nonrecipients will be able to borrow only if all members in the first half
have fully repaid their loans.  This implies that nonrecipient members will be waiting indefinitely in case of
default.
membership status and credit program placement, then the estimated partial effects of the
membership status variable would correctly measure the average effects of the credit
program on household welfare (see, for example, Heckman and Smith 1995, Moffitt 1991,
Pitt and Khandker 1995, and Morduch 1997).  In fact, most of the recent literature on the
difficulties of measuring the effects of credit programs concentrates on the statistical
problems related to survey design, sample selection, and endogeneity of program
placement, neglecting the issues related to substitution and fungibility, which are
somewhat specific to credit programs.  “Program effects” measured through the
membership status variable do not measure the effects of access to formal credit, and the
two may not even correlate.  There are at least two reasons why this is so.  First, most
microcredit programs provide an array of additional services besides credit (literacy
classes, business training, family planning education, and so on).  Therefore, the measure
of the impact of these programs on welfare outcomes includes the effect of changes in
behavior as a result of educational services (Pitt and Khandker 1995).  Second,
membership in a credit program does not guarantee access to its credit.  In fact, many
group-based microcredit programs (for example, two of the five studied in this paper)
stipulate explicitly that at any point in time only half of the group members can have






Members of one of the microcredit programs studied in the paper, The Mudzi Fund, could not borrow
2
from their organization for several months, because it was being incorporated into a larger credit program
(MRFC).
There are important identification issues to be discussed below.  These are related to the fact that the
3
lender’s choice of   depends on the borrower’s characteristics.
operate within ad hoc or continuously evolving institutional arrangements (especially those
that depend on short-term donor funding), provide their members  with less than certain
access to credit.
2
In summary, because neither the partial effects of credit received nor membership in
a credit program necessarily correlate with the benefits of access to formal credit, they
cannot be taken as measures of the effects of access to formal credit on household welfare. 
Therefore, unless one is concerned with measuring “program effects,” the credit limit 
is the appropriate variable for measuring the effect of access to formal credit on household
welfare.  Furthermore, the survey design and sample selection requirements for correctly
identifying the effects of   on household welfare are less stringent than those for
identifying “program effects” with the membership status variable.  Indeed, since   is a
continuous variable that is likely to vary through time and among credit program members
(especially if they belong to different programs), the impact of access to formal credit on
household welfare can still be identified and measured even if only credit program
members constitute the sample.  The estimates in this case, however, are conditional.   In
3
contrast, it is impossible to measure “program effects” without a sample containing both
members and nonmembers of credit programs.  Moreover, a quasi-experimental survey10
design is likely to be necessary in order to have a sample that allows a correct
identification of “program effects” (Pitt and Khandker 1995).  
3.  MODEL SPECIFICATION
In this section, the effects of access to formal credit on household welfare are
estimated using a reduced form model to determine (1) the household’s credit limits from
formal and informal sources of credit, (2) household demand for formal and informal
credits, and (3) household welfare issues of interest.  The section focuses on three aspects
of household welfare, the improvement of which are the stated objectives of microcredit
programs: income, food security, and nutritional status of children.  Food security is
measured by daily calorie and protein intake, and the nutritional status of children is
measured by weight-for-age and weight-for-age Z-scores.  However, the determinants of
farm and nonfarm incomes, and of food, are estimated as part of the reduced form model.
The reduced form equations for the credit limits, the demands for credit, and income
can be rationalized by a household utility maximization model in which the contractual
relationships between the household and its lenders and the (imperfect) substitutability
between formal and informal credit are explicitly recognized (see Diagne 1996; Diagne,
Zeller, and Sharma 1997).  The reduced form equations for calorie and protein intake and
nutritional status can be deduced by extending the basic household utility maximization
model into a Becker-type household production framework (see, for examples, Alderman
and Garcia 1994; Pitt and Khandker 1995).  Then the following reduced form linear
equations are postulated:b
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The interest rate for informal credit is not included in the model because 97 percent of recorded
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where  ,  ,  , and   are the credit limits and amounts borrowed for formal and
informal credits, respectively, and y is a generic household welfare variable.  For x, i
i=1,2,...,5, where each i represents a vector of household demographics and assets,
community characteristics, and prices.   and are vectors of characteristics for formal
and informal lenders and r is the (transaction-cost-adjusted) formal interest rate.   Finally,
4





























Note that this implies that (  can be different from zero for households whose credit constraints are
5           F
y
not (ex post) binding.  In other words, equations (3)-(5) apply to both ex post constrained and unconstrained
households and the estimated coefficients will measure average marginal effects across both types of
households.   For ex post unconstrained households, having a positive   is like having an insurance against
a liquidity constraint.
(6)
Using equations (5), (3), and (4), one can obtain the total marginal effect of access
to formal credit on any household welfare outcome y and its different components (direct
effect, substitution effect, and indirect effect through borrowing):
As equation (6) shows, (  measures the direct marginal effect on y of merely y
F
having access to formal credit.  It is hypothesized that this direct effect is positive for most
welfare outcomes because, as argued above, the option to borrow, even if not exercised,
should reduce the household’s (low- or negative-return) precautionary savings and its
needs for risk-reducing but inefficient income diversification strategies.   However, gaining
5
and maintaining access to a source of credit is rarely costless as potential borrowers often
are involved in gift-giving or bribing, or are required by group-based lending programs to
attend regular and time-consuming meetings just to be eligible.  If these costs outweigh
the direct benefits, then (  may end up being negative. y
F
The product 2  (  measures the marginal effect of access to formal credit on y
F  F
1
when the household exercises its option to borrow.  Assuming that the loan thus obtained
is used in a productive investment, one can expect 2  (  to be positive for most
F  F
113
What is referred to here as overall household overall welfare is the indirect utility or its money-metric
6
equivalent, and is not affected, by definition, by the pure substitution effect.  Household income, although
treated here as a welfare outcome, is merely an “input” toward overall household welfare and can be affected
by the pure substitution effect.  The other measures of household welfare used in this paper (food security and
nutritional status) can also be affected by the pure substitution effect because they constitute only part of the
overall household welfare, which includes the satisfaction derived from the consumption of nonfood
commodities.  However, the pure substitution effects on these three components of overall welfare should
compensate for each other so as to sum to zero.
The two effects can be separated only with a structural model.
7
components of welfare (at least in the long run).  However, 2  (  may be negative in the
F  F
1
short run for some welfare components.  For example, if the loan obtained is not enough
for the intended investment, then the household may reduce its consumption to make up
for the shortfall.  This can lead, for example, to a negative 2  (  for calorie intake.
F  F
1
The product 2 (  is the marginal effect of access to formal credit on y due to
I  F
2
substitutability between formal and informal credit. This is a gross substitution effect
obtained without holding the household utility (or overall welfare) constant when access
to formal credit is changed.  Therefore, it includes both the pure substitution effect
(obtained by holding utility constant) and the income or welfare effect.  By definition, the
pure substitution effect does not have any (overall) effect on welfare.   But it cannot be
6
separated from the income or welfare effect in this reduced form specification.  
7
Therefore, the gross substitution effect can be different from zero, but its sign on any
welfare outcome equation can be either positive or negative depending on whether
informal credit and formal credit are (gross) substitutes or complements (indicated by the
sign of ( ), and on how informal credit is related to the welfare outcome in question (that 2
F
is, the sign of 2).
Iz F
14
If the amount borrowed was used to measure the marginal impact of access to
credit on y, one would obtain 2 .  This implies the following restrictions: (1) (  =1
F                F
1
(households are always credit constrained and would borrow the full amount of any
increase in their credit lines), (2) ( =0 or  2=0 (formal and informal credit are not 2
I      I
substitutable or households do not used informal credit even if they have access to it), and
(3) ( =0 (there is no benefit from merely having access to formal credit without y
F
borrowing).  Similarly, the use of the membership status variable (which is implicitly part
of , the vector of the characteristics of formal lenders) to measure the impact of access
to credit on y implies the same restrictions along with the restriction that 2 =0.
F
IDENTIFICATION OF THE MODEL
Equations (1) through (5) form a recursive system of simultaneous equations, with
the exogenous variables constituted by the household demographics and assets,
community characteristics, and lenders’ characteristics appearing in all equations.  Hence,
exclusion restrictions on these variables are needed to identify the system.  The
simultaneity of the credit limit variables (which are choice variables for lenders, not
borrowers) results from the fact that the variables are likely to be correlated with the
unobservable household characteristics absorbed into the error terms u and v. 
(Unobservable characteristics could include a household's likelihood to default.)  Any
household demographic, community characteristics, and prices observed by the
econometrician are probably observable by informal lenders.  The same can be said for15
All the other potential variables (such as source of program funding, whether the program is for
8
agricultural inputs or for nonfarm income, and so on) turned out to be perfectly correlated with the program
dummies.
formal lenders, especially those that use the group-based lending technology popularized
by the Grameen Bank.  In addition, these observable factors are likely to determine both
lenders’ choices of credit limits and borrowers’ choices of loan sizes.  Therefore, as
argued by Udry (1995), one should not expect to find exclusion restrictions on these sets
of variables in order to identify equations (3) and (4).
The main argument used in this study to identify equations (3) and (4) is that not all
the variables for a lender’s characteristics enter directly into determining the amount
borrowed. That is, some of the lender’s characteristics influence the amounts borrowed
only through the effects they have in determining how much the lender is willing to lend. 
For informal credit, the information collected on the lender’s characteristics are: relative
wealth compared to the borrower, professional occupation, relation to the borrower, place
of residence, and whether he or she is a member of a credit program.  All these
characteristics influence  the amounts borrowed only through the informal credit limit. 
For formal credit, the only available information on the lender’s characteristics is for the
program dummy variables.   These program dummies, which stand for the formal lenders’
8bmax
16
One can conceive of circumstances in which the lender’s identity influences directly the size of the
9
loan sought by a borrower.  For example, borrowers may be willing to borrow more from lenders with lax
credit recovery systems compared to those who punish default harshly, even if the credit limits from both
sources are the same.  This possibility is ruled out for the purpose of identifying the model.
Only the characteristics of those lenders whose loan transactions were recorded are  used as
10
instruments.  Unfortunately, we did not collect the characteristics of lenders for households that were not
involved in any loan transaction (although their   were collected).  The information could have been
collected but we became aware of the problem too late in the survey for it to be collected.  The characteristics
of formal and informal lenders used in the estimation are all in the form of dummy variables, which were set
to zero for households not involved in any loan transaction.
identities and other unobserved specific attributes, influence the amounts borrowed only
through the formal credit limit.
9, 10
Finally, to identify the outcome equation (5), reasonable exclusion restrictions on
household demographics, community characteristics, and prices are used (see the tables of
results in the appendix for details).  In addition to these restrictions, other exclusion
restrictions used (and implicit in the equation) are that the formal interest rate and informal
lenders’ characteristics affect household welfare outcomes only through the amounts of
credit demanded and the informal credit limit, respectively.  On the other hand, formal
lenders’ characteristics are allowed to influence household welfare outcomes directly
because, as already mentioned, most microcredit  programs provide educational services
aimed at inducing behavioral changes that would directly improve household welfare. 
However, because the only formal lenders’ characteristics in the estimated model are the
dummy variables identifying the different programs, the estimated effects of the program
dummies reflect mostly the effects of their targeted nature and self-selection.  These17
effects cannot be separated from the effects of the additional services provided by the
programs because of the nonexperimental nature of the sample-selection process.
SAMPLING AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGIES
The data used in the analysis come from a year-long three-round survey (February
1995 through December 1995) of 404 households in 45 villages in 5 districts of Malawi. 
Four local microcredit programs were studied.  The four programs are: Malawi Rural
Finance Company (MRFC, a state-owned and nationwide agricultural credit program),
Promotion of Micro-Enterprises for Rural Women (PMERW, a microcredit program for
nonfarm income generation activities supported by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit, The Malawi Mudzi Fund (MMF, a program funded by the
International Fund for Agricultural Development and modeled on the Grameen Bank and
now incorporated into MRFC), and the Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives
(MUSCCO, a union of locally based saving and credit unions).  All the programs are
based on group lending except MUSCCO.
If the sample could have been drawn randomly, then, given the above identifying
restrictions, the system could have been estimated straightforwardly using standard
simultaneous equation estimation methods.  However, despite the existence of numerous
credit programs in Malawi, participation is rare.  Out of 4,700 households enumerated in
the 45 villages covered by the village census, only 12 percent were current members of a
credit program.  Moreover, the 12 percent figure significantly overstates the likelihood of18
credit program membership because it represents the percentage of membership in villages
that are actually hosting the four credit programs studied.  The majority of villages in
Malawi do not host any credit program.  The low participation rate ruled out at the outset
straight random sampling at any geographical level beyond the village level.  The only
feasible alternative was to stratify along the program membership status variable, with
random selection within each stratum.  About half of the sample was selected from
participants of the four credit programs.  The other half of the sample was equally divided
between past participants (mostly from a failed government credit program) and
households that had never participated in any formal credit program.   For details on the
survey and data collection methodology, see Diagne, Zeller, and Mataya 1996.
Under the circumstances stated above, not only is the chosen method of choice-
based sampling more cost-efficient than straight random sampling, but it yields estimates
with better statistical properties than those obtained under straight random sampling,
provided the appropriate estimation methods are used (Manski and McFadden 1981;
Cosslett 1981 and 1993; Amemiya 1985).  Appendix 1 shows that the choice-based
sampling correction required when estimating the system (equations [1] through [5])
involves only the equations where the program dummies appear as regressors.  Moreover,
the correction consists merely of replacing the program dummies by the corresponding
choice-based-corrected conditional probability choices.  The choice-based corrected





















where y and x are generic dependent variable and regressor, respectively, " and $ are the j
parameters to be estimated. and 
are the choice-based-corrected conditional probability choices.  The indexes j=1,...,J are
the mutually exclusive J program choices defining the strata, and j designates the stratum i
of the i  household.   is the population conditional-choice probability that program j
th
is chosen given x.    and  are the respective sampling and population
ratios, with n (respectively, N) being the size of the sample (respectively, population) j    j
strata defined by program j, and n and N being, respectively, the total sample and
population sizes.  Note that the calculation of the partial effects of any variable in a
equation corrected for choice-based sampling has to take into account the changes in w if j
that variable appears also as a regressor in the estimation of .Q(j)/H(j)
p(j|x)
20
The ratio is the sample analogue of the Manski-Lerman weight used in the weighted
11
maximum-likelihood procedure to get consistent estimates under choice-based sampling (see Manski and
McFadden 1981 or Amemiya 1985, chapter 9).
A two-stage estimation method similar to Heckman’s two-step procedure for Tobit
models is used to estimate equation (7).  In the first stage, the Manski-Lerman weighted
maximum likelihood estimator is used to consistently estimate the conditional probability
choices  and construct the w.    In the second stage, the estimated w are used in j                 j
11
equation (7) to estimate each resulting equation with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or
a Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) procedure, depending on the equation.
 A four-alternative two-level nested multinomial logit model is used to estimate the
population conditional choice probabilities (see Appendix 1 for details).  However, the
model allows the vector of parameters to be different across the four alternative choices
(Judge et al. 1985; Maddala 1983; Schmidt and Strauss 1975).  The four mutually
exclusive alternative choices correspond to (1) being a member of MRFC, (2) being a
member of one of the other three microcredit programs (Mudzi Fund, MUSCCO, or
PMERW), (3) being a past member of a credit program, and (4) never having been a
member of a credit program.  This classification corresponds exactly to the stratification
used in selecting the households.  In each village there are at most two credit programs
operating: MRFC and one of the other three programs, which are generically called
PROG2 (choice variable) in the estimated model.  However, the program dummy variables
(Mudzi, MUSCCO, and PMERW) were used as alternative-specific regressors instead of
the generic label.  As usual in a multinomial discrete choice model, these dummy21
PMERW1 is a revolving fund targeted to very poor women while PMERW2 operates through one
12
of the main commercial banks in Malawi as a loan guarantee scheme.  PMERW2 members are either
“graduates” of PMERW1 or successful but not very wealthy business women living in the areas covered by
the program.
All the partial effects are calculated for each household before taking weighted averages across
13
households.  This is preferable to evaluating partial effects at the means because of the nonlinearities in the
probability choices (all estimations and computations were performed with GAUSS).
alternative-specific variables control for unobserved attributes specific to each alternative. 
These attributes can explain why a household prefers one alternative over another.  In fact,
for PMERW, its two sister programs (designated here as PMERW1 and PMERW2) are
differentiated because of their different attributes and target groups.   Therefore, the
12
partial effects for all the program dummies are estimated for both the conditional
probability choices and for the equations, including the three choice-based-corrected
conditional probability choices for MRFC, PROG2, and past members (these are the wj
above).  The three choices are called WMRFC, WPROG2, and WPAST in the tables
reporting the results of the estimation.
13
Finally, the estimation procedure followed McFadden’s (1981) sequential maximum
likelihood estimation for nested multinomial logit models.  Because of the sequential
nature of McFadden’s procedure, the usual maximum likelihood standard errors are not
valid. Therefore, the Bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani 1993; Jeong and Maddala
1993) was used to calculate standard errors for all the estimated conditional probability
choice parameters and the subsequently estimated simultaneous equations system.  (The
Bootstrap method is implemented by replicating, with replacement, the sampling
procedure used to select the households.)  To account for the possibility of the22
instruments being only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables, the relevant F
statistics and exogeneity and overidentification test statistics were computed for each
equation following Staiger and Stock (1997).
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
THE DATA
The survey includes information on household demographics, land tenure,
agricultural production, livestock ownership, asset ownership and transactions, food and
nonfood consumption, credit, savings and gift transactions, wage, self-employment income
and time allocation, and anthropometric status of preschoolers and their mothers.  The
agricultural data cover the 1993/94 and 1994/95 seasons.  Because the methodology used
in this paper to assess the effects of access to credit on household welfare is based on the
credit limit, few details will be given on the way the credit limit variable was collected in
the survey.
The questionnaire on credit and savings was administered to all adult household
members (over 17 years old) in the sample.  In each round, respondents were asked what
was the maximum amount they could borrow during the recall period from both informal
and formal sources of credit.  If the respondent borrowed or tried to borrow, the question
was asked for each loan transaction (both for granted and rejected loan demands).  The
credit limit in these transactions refers to the time of borrowing and the lender involved.  If
the respondent did not ask for any loan, the question was asked separately for formal andQ(j)/H(j)
23
All the summary statistics have been weighted using the strata population weights from the village
14
census and the district-level 1987 population census data.
To correct for the over sampling of credit program participants, the summary statistics in the tables
15
have been weighted using the strata population and sample ratios ( ), which were corrected with
weights constructed using the district-level 1987 population census data.
The exchange rate is US$1 for 15 Malawi Kwacha (MK).
16
informal sources of credit, with no reference to particular formal or informal lenders. 
Respondents who received loans were also asked the same general question (that is, with
no reference to particular formal or informal lenders) in a way that elicited the credit limit
they would face if they wanted more loans, not just from the same lender, but from the
same sector of the credit market (formal or informal).  Consequently, for both formal and
informal credit, the maximum formal and informal credit limits of each adult household
member were obtained in each round, even if the member was not involved in any loan
transaction.
The Distribution of Formal and Informal Credit Limits
14
Table 1 presents the average maximum informal and formal credit limits from
October 1993 to December 1995 for the whole population and for formal sector
borrowers only.   In particular, the table shows that the average maximum formal and
15
informal credit limits for the population as a whole are 167 and 99 Malawi Kwacha (MK),
respectively.   The corresponding figures for formal sector borrowers were 675 and 90
16
MK, respectively.  To put these figures in perspective, Malawi’s 1995 per capita GNP was24
US$170 (2,550 MK) and the average per capita 1995 income in the sample was 1,190
MK.  The box plot diagrams of the distributions presented in Figure 1 give a better 
Table 1—Formal and informal credit limits in Malawi (October 1993 to December
1995)
    All respondents     Formal sector borrowers only
Credit limits Formal Informal Formal Informal
(MK)
a
Mean 167 99 675 90
Median  0 40 500 20
Standard deviation 497 354 911 499
Minimum 0 0 13 0
Maximum 10,000 12,000 10,000 12,000
Source: International Food Policy Research Institute and Rural Development
Department, Bunda College of Agriculture, Rural Finance Survey, 1995.
 US$1 = 15 Malawi Kwacha (MK).


































































Figure 1—Distribution of formal and informal credit limits in Malawi (October 1993 to December 1995):  Box plot
diagrams
All Respondents
Formal Sector Borrowers Only
Notes: Box plot diagrams are interpreted as follow: For each box, 50 percent of cases have values within the box and the solid horizontal line inside
is the median.  The length of the box is the interquartile range and the lower boundary (resp upper boundary) of the box is the 25th
(respectively, 75th) percentile.  Finally, the circles are outliers and the stars are extreme values.  The exchange rate is US$1 = 15 MK. 
Malawi’s 1995 per capita GNP was US$170 (2,550 MK).26
picture of the extent of access to credit in Malawi.  The figure shows that the median
formal and informal credit limits in the population as a whole are, respectively, zero and
40 MK.  Fifty percent of the population can borrow at most 100 MK (less than US$10)
from either sector of the credit market.  Formal sector borrowers have a higher median
formal credit limit (375 MK) but a lower median informal credit limit (20 MK).  This
likely reflects of the fact that two of the credit programs studied are targeted to poor
women who might have been excluded from the few existing sources of informal credit
because of their socioeconomic situation (see Figure 1).
Household Income
Table 2 shows that the average 1995 per capita total household income in the
survey areas was 1,190 MK for 1995 and 986 MK for 1994.  The average per capita crop
income in the drought year of 1994 (161 MK) is half the average crop income for 1995.
This shows the high income risk that agricultural households relying only on crop
production have to face in Malawi.  On the other hand, nonfarm income generating
activities, which are presumably less dependent on weather, may be not only a less risky
source of income, but also a substantial source of income for rural households (more than
twice the average crop income).  Finally, the average per capita total income of credit
program participants in 1994 (1,559 MK) and 1995 (1,833 MK) is almost twice as high as
that of past participants (756 and 1,017 MK, respectively) and that of households who
never participated in any credit program (856 and 1,025 MK, respectively).2
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Table 2—Household per capita incomes, food expenditure, calorie intake, and nutritional status:  By credit program
membership
                                         Current members                                              
All Mudzi Past Never been
households MRFC Fund MUSCCO PMERW1 PMERW2 Other All members members
Total income (MK)
a
1994 986 1,565 1,389 805 1,039 2,844 1,567 1,559 756 856
1995 1,190 1,843 1,493 1,471 1,212 4,204 1,978 1,833 1,017 1,025
Crop income (MK)
1994 161 155 –76 227 49 249 397 154 166 161
1995 365 433 28 893 223 1,608 809 429 427 330
Nonfarm income (1995, MK) 825 1,410 1,465 578 989 2,596 1,170 1,404 590 695
Monthly food expenditure (MK) 129 112 137 104 113 142 173 120 94 140
Daily calorie intake (Kcal) 2,184 1,949 2,168 2,083 1,985 2,094 1,984 1,979 1,901  2,313
Average share of food out of total
consumption 88% 86% 80% 87% 84% 83%  85% 86%  91%  88%
Average share of food out of total
cash expenditure 71% 75% 73% 64% 75% 76% 74% 74% 71% 70%
Height-for-age
–1 s.d. below reference 66% 72% 77% 72% 79% 71% 83% 74% 72% 62%
–2 s.d. below reference 46% 55% 49% 53% 58% 45% 43% 53% 61% 39%
Weight-for-age
–1 s.d. below reference 46% 55% 40% 49% 45% 37% 60%  52% 51% 42%
–2 s.d. below reference 16% 20%  8% 18% 19% 13% 2% 17% 21% 15%
Source: International Food Policy Research Institute/Rural Development Department, Bunda College of Agriculture (IFPRI/RDD), Rural Finance
Survey, 1995.
Notes: The 1994 nonfarm income information was not collected, but it is assumed to be the same as for 1995.  Total food expenditure includes the
imputed value of food out of home production.  Kcal stands for kilocalories; s.d. for standard deviation.
 US$1 = 15 MK.
a28
Household Expenditures and Calorie Intake
Table 2 shows that the average household per capita monthly total expenditure in
the survey areas is 129 MK, with a relatively high share of food in the household monthly
consumption budget (88 percent, including the imputed value of home produced food). 
The average per capita daily intake in the sample was 2,184 kilocalories, which is close to
the 2,200 kcal/person/day recommended for Malawi.  The average per capita daily calorie
intake of households who never participated in any credit program is higher than that for
any of the participants of the credit programs studied.  This suggests that participants may
not be spending their increased income on food; or if they do, they are spending it on
luxurious foods with relatively lower calorie content.
Household Nutritional Status
Table 2 shows that 46 percent of preschoolers in the survey areas are chronically
malnourished as measured by the height-for-age Z-scores and are thus stunted.  This is
close to the 48.6 percent figure for children under five years of age found in Malawi's
1992 Demographic and Health Survey.  As measured by the weight-for-age Z-scores, 16
percent of preschoolers are acutely malnourished.  Finally, households who never
participated in any credit program have the lowest prevalence of chronic malnutrition
among preschoolers (39 percent compared to an average of 53 percent for all participants,
and 61 percent for past participants).  However, the weight-for-age figures show only a
slight difference in the prevalence of acute malnutrition between households that never29
The estimation results for the conditional probability choices are reported and discussed by Diagne
17
(1997), who also discusses the estimation procedure in greater detail.
When the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors, Staiger and Stock
18
(1997) recommend using the Durbin and Basmann tests when testing the exogeneity and overidentification
restrictions, respectively.  The Basmann test uses the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML)
estimates.
participated and participating households as a whole (15 percent and 17 percent
respectively).
MARGINAL EFFECTS OF ACCESS TO CREDIT ON HOUSEHOLD WELFARE
The system of equations (1) through (5) was estimated using the two-stage
methodology outlined in Section 3.  The results of the estimation are presented in Tables
3-14.    The relevant F statistics and exogeneity and overidentification test statistics are
17
also presented for each equation.  In particular, the high F statistics for the joint
significance of the lenders’ characteristics (the program dummies) in the formal credit limit
equation (F  =50.41) should be noted.  On the other hand, the F statistics for the joint 3,1505
significance of the informal lenders’ characteristics in the informal credit limit equation is
relatively low (F  =3.88).  The informal lenders’ characteristics may introduce biases in 7,1505
the TSLS estimates of the credit demand equations due to their weak correlations with the
informal credit limit (Staiger and Stock 1997).  Furthermore, for both the formal and
informal credit demand equations, The Wu-Hausman and Durbin tests fail to reject the null
hypothesis of exogeneity of the presumed endogenous variables.  The overidentifying
restrictions are also rejected by the Basmann test.   Under these conditions, it is more
1830
      For the credit demand equations, there was not much difference between the TSLS and OLS estimates.  There were,
19
however, noticeable differences between the TSLS and OLS estimates for the food expenditure and calorie intake equations.
appropriate to estimate the two credit demand equations with OLS.  The reported results
are OLS estimates.  The reported results for the food expenditure and calorie intake
equations are also OLS estimates, for similar reasons.
19
Access to Credit and the Demands for Formal and Informal Credits
In order to focus on the assessment of the effects of access to formal credit on
household welfare and keep the paper short, only results for the credit limits and loan
demands directly relevant to the impact equations are discussed.  For a full discussion of
the access and participation equations, see Diagne 1997.  In Tables 3 through 6, the
following facts are relevant for the impact assessment:
1. All five credit programs have contributed statistically significantly to the
access their member households have to formal credit.  Differences with
noncurrent members range from as low as 20 MK per capita per season for
MRFC to as high as 57 MK per capita per season for PMERW1.
2. The estimated average marginal propensity to borrow out of every additional
MK of formal credit made available (FLOANMAX) is estimated at 0.49 and
is statistically significantly different from both zero and 1 (at the 5 percent
level).  Hence, households are on average marginally constrained in their 31
Table 3—Formal credit limit equation (FLOANMAX): Matrix of direct and indirect
partial effects of selected variables
Indirect effect through
       Direct effect          the probability choices          Total effect         
a
Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard
Independent variable coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error
CONSTANT –2,534.62 343.0319 –2,534.62 343.0319
MRFCH 19.6259 3.9254 19.6259 3.9254
MUDZIH 54.0689 7.6468 54.0689 7.6468
MUSCOH 33.7595 6.2161 33.7595 6.2161
PMERW1H 56.8125 8.0875 56.8125 8.0875
PMERW2H 56.4310 7.7808 56.4310 7.7808
WMRFC 2,913.05 309.66 2,913.05 309.66
WPROG2 2,928.46 322.59 2,928.46 322.59
WDPAST 2,790.41 328.91 2,790.41 328.91
FPDEFLT –20.7784 13.8852 –2.7817 0.8726 –23.5600 13.7048
DP9495 –10.8881 4.6691 –10.8881 4.6691
LANDAREH 7.0622 5.7895 0.4440 0.8846 7.5062 6.0081
AGLPAREA 0.2929 0.3149 0.2658 0.0757 0.5587 0.3190
TASSETVH 0.0017 0.0033 0.0009 0.0004 0.0026 0.0032
LDPASSTH –79.3011 28.5800 15.3997 6.2558 –63.9014 29.9756
LVPASSTH –46.0946 34.1626 –7.2518 10.3868 –53.3463 37.0432
YYEDUCH –0.0618 2.4691 –0.6180 0.5209 –0.6798 2.4549
YYEDUCS 2.4703 2.7511 1.5237 0.5690 3.9940 2.7320
POPADL15  –19.6817 5.4872 9.0646 1.5756 –10.6171 5.7452
DEPRATIO –90.6065 33.2885 35.7310 7.5305 –54.8756 34.9863
AGEH –0.0063 0.5270 –0.0244 0.0977 –0.0307 0.5538
MALEHEAD –18.3682 16.3404 5.8149 2.4588 –12.5533 16.5945
PVMAIZE 5.9506 4.5373 –1.7266 0.9757 4.2240 4.8009
PPTOB95 3.9528 2.9707 –0.0950 0.4106 3.8578 2.9262
PVOXEN 0.0062 0.0102 –0.0042 0.0045 0.0020 0.0111
PVCATL 0.0341 0.0143 0.0183 0.0037 0.0524 0.0146
PVGSHP –0.8954 0.3711 –0.0881 0.0635 –0.9835 0.3691
PVCHKD 0.0218 0.0188 –0.0022 0.0026 0.0196 0.0189
NWLSBUY 21.7647 7.6705 1.7904 1.2270 23.5552 7.8415
DISTFA –4.1433 2.0048 –1.5329 0.2872 –5.6762 2.0243
DISTPO 6.7724 2.2097 0.6807 0.1656 7.4531 2.2246
DISTPSCH 6.1053 5.9583 6.1053 5.9583
DISTTCEN –5.5751 2.2008 –5.5751 2.2008
SOUTH –72.9070 47.1576 –72.9070 47.1576
R-squared = 0.20
F-stat. (all coefficients): F  = 7.38 (49,1458)
F-stat for the program dummies: F  = 50.41 (3,1505)
F-stat for all instruments : F  = 9.15
2
(27,1481)
Note: These are the exogenous regressors used as instruments in some of the other equations of the system:
WMRFC WPROG2 WPAST PVMAIZE PVCASVA PVBEANS PVVEGFRT PVMEAFSH PVDRINK
PVOTHER PPTOB95 PVOXEN PVCATL PVGSHP PVCHKD CDTH3Y CILLAC3Y PHVKM PSVKM
NCLWATER NWLSBUY DISTFA DISTPO DISTPSCH DISTTCEN CROPRISK CVGAPYYP.
 The column of direct effects corresponds to the estimated coefficients of the variables included in the equations.
a32
Table 4—Informal credit limit equation (ILOANMAX): Estimated coefficients of
selected variables (partial effects)
                        Partial effect                      






























F-stat. (all coefficients): F  = 3.47 (56,1451)
F-stat lender characteristics  : F  = 3.88
a
(7,1501)
F-stat for all instruments : F  = 2.60
b
(31,1477)
RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND RICHLEND SVLGLEND NGOLEND.
a
These are the exogenous regressors used as instruments in some of the other equations of the system:
b
RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND RICHLEND SVLGLEND NGOLEND
PVMAIZE PVCASVA PVBEANS PVVEGFRT PVMEAFSH PVDRINK  PVOTHER PPTOB95
PVOXEN PVCATL PVGSHP PVCHKD CDTH3Y CILLAC3Y PHVKM PSVKM NCLWATER 
NWLSBUY DISTFA DISTPO DISTPSCH DISTTCEN CROPRISK CVGAPYYP33
Table 5—Formal credit demand equation (FLOANVAL): Matrix of direct and
indirect partial effects of selected variables
                Indirect effect through                
      Direct effect             FLOANMAX             ILOANMAX                Total effect          
a
Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard
Independent variable coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error
CONSTANT 2.1633 17.2245 2.1633 17.2245
FLOANMAX 0.4887 0.0873 0.4887 0.0873
ILOANMAX -0.0411 0.0435 -0.0411 0.0435
MRFCH 9.5921 2.0898 9.5921 2.0898
MUDZIH 26.4259 3.8919 26.4259 3.8919
MUSCOH 16.4998 3.0489 16.4998 3.0489
PMERW1H 27.7668 4.0558 27.7668 4.0558
PMERW2H 27.5804 3.8885 27.5804 3.8885
WMRFC 1,423.73 192.06 1423.73 192.06
WPROG2 1,431.26 191.69 1431.26 191.69
WDPAST 1,363.80 196.57 1363.80 196.57
DP9495 13.6721 2.8850 -5.3215 2.1320 0.1662 0.2369 8.5168 3.8359
FWEEKDLY -0.7499 1.0541 -0.7499 1.0541
FNOCLCND 16.4898 13.2291 16.4898 13.2291
IWEEKDLY 4.4648 4.0671 4.4648 4.0671
IDUEDATE 63.6118  9.6131 63.6118 9.6131
INOCLCND -27.7287 6.5529 -27.7287 6.5529
IAMTSTD  0.0597 0.1718 0.0597 0.1718
FAMTSTD  -0.1085 0.0571 -0.1085 0.0571
FPDEFLT -11.5148 7.5773 -0.0883 0.2636 -11.6032 7.5652
FAINRATT 2.1165 15.5655 2.1165 15.5655
PVMAIZE 4.6982 2.3373 2.0645 2.6874 0.0417 0.1794 6.8043 2.9309
PPTOB95 -0.5920 0.6393 1.8855 1.4113 0.0336 0.0463 1.3271 1.6583
PSTOB95 6.8688 3.7419 6.8688 3.7419
PCFERT95 4.3571 1.7454 4.3571 1.7454
PSLMZ95 -0.0203 0.1641 -0.0203 0.1641
PSHMZ95 -1.4519 1.1416 -1.4519 1.1416
LANDAREH 1.3184 2.1390 3.6686 3.2649 -0.2465 0.2732 4.7405 3.7103
AGLPAREA -0.0822 0.0995 0.2731 0.1586 0.0032 0.0066 0.1941 0.1666
TASSETVH 0.0007 0.0006 0.0013 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0022
LDPASSTH -7.3556 8.5398 1.2315 5.3376 1.1061 1.3246 -37.4811 16.2740
LVPASSTH 20.4063 9.5880 -26.0728 21.5138 1.0771 1.3185 -45.4020 23.0834
YYEDUCH -1.4005 0.8164 -0.3323 1.2185 -0.0354 0.0638 -1.7682 1.3786
YYEDUCS -0.3242 0.6678 1.9520 1.3535 -0.0078 0.0412 1.6201 1.3462
POPADL15 -3.0591 2.1362 -5.1890 2.9123 0.0409 0.1085 -8.2073 3.4768
DEPRATIO 18.9232 10.6739 -26.8202 18.6753 0.7248 0.8437 -45.0186 20.2506
AGEH -0.1029 0.1572 -0.0150 0.2720 0.0096 0.0136 -0.1084 0.2711
MALEHEAD 0.6103 4.8669 -6.1354 7.8765 0.1767 0.3420 -5.3483 9.1147
DISTFA -2.7742 1.0331 0.0166 0.0412 -2.7576 1.0292
DISTPO 3.6427 1.2170 0.0263 0.0388 3.6690 1.2229
DISTTCEN -2.7248 1.1966 0.0311 0.0517 -2.6937 1.1873
SOUTH 3.4651 7.3878 -35.6329 23.0927 0.7590 1.1775 -31.4088 21.6019
R-squared = 0.33
F-stat.(all coefficients): F  = 16.40 (44,1463)
F-stat. for the regressors used as instruments in other equations: F  = 1.36 (13,1495)
Wu-Hausman Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 0.58 
b
(9)
Durbin Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 1.39
b
(9)
Basmann's Chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions : x  = 49.98
c
(60)
The column of direct effects corresponds to the OLS coefficients of the variables included in the equations.
a
Endogenous regressors: FLOANMAX ILOANMAX  IAMTSTD  FAMTSTD  CINC94 FGIFTRV CDWAGE
b
CWMWAGE CFCWAGE.
Instruments tested: WMRFC WPROG2 WPAST RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND RICHLEND
c
SVLGLEND NGOLEND PVOXEN PVCATL PVGSHP PVCHKD PHVKM PSVKM NCLWATER LATRINE
NWLSBUY DISTFA DISTPO DISTPSCH DISTTCEN CROPRISK CVGAPYYP.34
Table 6—Informal credit demand equation (ILOANVAL): Matrix of direct and
indirect partial effects of selected variables
                Indirect effect through                
      Direct effect             FLOANMAX             ILOANMAX                Total effect         
a
Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard
Independent variable coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error
CONSTANT 0.0570 2.9869 0.0570 2.9869
FLOANMAX -0.0034 0.0019 -0.0034 0.0019
ILOANMAX 0.0680 0.0227 0.0680 0.0227
MRFCH -0.0677 0.0172 -0.0677 0.0172
MUDZIH -0.1865 0.0431 -0.1865 0.0431
MUSCOH -0.1165 0.0338 -0.1165 0.0338
PMERW1H -0.1960 0.0450 -0.1960 0.0450
PMERW2H -0.1947 0.0435 -0.1947 0.0435
WMRFC -10.0494 3.0750 -10.0494 3.0750
WPROG2 -10.1025 3.0391 -10.1025 3.0391
WDPAST -9.6263 3.0359 -9.6263 3.0359
DP9495 -0.0731 0.4805 0.0376 0.0213 -0.2751 0.2198 -0.3106 0.4886
FWEEKDLY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0813 0.0671 0.1461 0.2931 0.2274 0.2930
FNOCLCND -0.1278 0.1597 -0.1278 0.1597
IWEEKDLY -1.2613 0.8090 -1.2613 0.8090
IDUEDATE 6.5236 2.9264 6.5236 2.9264
INOCLCND 1.5294 0.8221 1.5294 0.8221
IAMTSTD 19.4587 2.4285 19.4587 2.4285
FAMTSTD -0.1046 0.0838 -0.1046 0.0838
FPDEFLT 0.0025 0.0036 0.0025 0.0036
FAINRATT 1.7213 1.8740 1.7213 1.8740
PVMAIZE 0.0001 0.2500 -0.0146 0.0221 -0.0690 0.1594 -0.0834 0.2560
PPTOB95 0.0012 0.0523 -0.0133 0.0131 -0.0556 0.0318 -0.0678 0.0612
PSTOB95 -0.6294 0.5177 -0.6294 0.5177
PCFERT95 -0.0204 0.2696 -0.0204 0.2696
PSLMZ95 0.0012 0.0067 0.0012 0.0067
PSHMZ95 -0.0163 0.1761 -0.0163 0.1761
LANDAREH -0.1317 0.3408 -0.0259 0.0292 0.4079 0.1765 0.2503 0.3205
AGLPAREA -0.0193 0.0170 -0.0019 0.0014 -0.0053 0.0059 -0.0265 0.0180
TASSETVH 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002
LDPASSTH 2.3883 1.1688 0.2204 0.1758 -1.8303 0.6484 0.7785 1.1080
LVPASSTH 1.3474 1.2919 0.1840 0.1786 -1.7823 0.6994 -0.2509 1.2871
YYEDUCH -0.0265 0.1554 0.0023 0.0087 0.0586 0.0500 0.0345 0.1788
YYEDUCS 0.1984 0.1130 -0.0138 0.0104 0.0129 0.0490 0.1975 0.1272
POPADL15 -0.3012 0.2459 0.0366 0.0239 -0.0676 0.1092 -0.3322 0.2702
DEPRATIO -0.2360 1.3061 0.1893 0.1389 -1.1994 0.6180 -1.2461 1.3453
AGEH 0.0151 0.0228 0.0001 0.0019 -0.0158 0.0133 -0.0006 0.0217
MALEHEAD 0.1279 0.7859 0.0433 0.0596 -0.2924 0.2976 -0.1212 0.8512
DISTFA 0.0196 0.0078 -0.0275 0.0380 -0.0079 0.0384
DISTPO -0.0257 0.0103 -0.0436 0.0305 -0.0693 0.0317
DISTTCEN 0.0192 0.0144 -0.0515 0.0489 -0.0322 0.0518
SOUTH 2.0511 1.1483 0.2515 0.2050 -1.2559 0.8844 1.0467 1.6091
R-squared = 0.35
F-stat.(all coefficients): F  = 18 (44,1463)
F-stat. for the regressors used as instruments in other equations: F  = 1.14 (13,1495)
Wu-Hausman Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 1.02 
b
(9)
Durbin Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 1.12
c
(9)
Basmann's Chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions : x  = 102.83
3
(60)
The column of direct effects corresponds to the OLS coefficients of the variables included in the equations.
a
Endogenous regressors: FLOANMAX ILOANMAX IAMTSTD FAMTSTD CINC94 FGIFTRV CDWAGE
b
CWMWAGE CFCWAGE
Instruments tested: WMRFC WPROG2 WPAST RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND
c
RICHLEND SVLGLEND NGOLEND PVOXEN PVCATL PVGSHP PVCHKD PHVKM PSVKM NCLWATER
LATRINE NWLSBUY DISTFA DISTPO DISTPSCH DISTTCEN CROPRISK CVGAPYYP.35
demands for formal credit, but on average would borrow only about half the
amount of any increase in their formal credit limits.  Therefore, one of the
restrictions implied by the practice of using loan size to measure impact is not
satisfied.
3. The availability of informal credit (ILOANMAX) has a negative but not
statistically significant effect on the demand for formal credit.
4. For all households, the availability of formal credit induces a small and not
statistically significant reduction in the demand for informal credit.  However,
this reduction is much larger for credit program members, with statistically
significant differences with noncurrent members ranging from –0.07 MK for
MRFC to –0.19 MK for PMERW1 per capita per season.  At least for credit
program members, one can reject the restriction that formal and informal
credits are not (grossly) substitutable.
5. Finally, the interest rate for formal credit (FAINRATT) does not have any
statistically significant effect on the demands for formal and informal credits. 
This suggests that improved access to credit is much more important than its
cost for the study households.36
Marginal Effect of Access to Formal Credit on Household Incomes
The estimated marginal effects of access to formal and informal credits on crop
income, seasonal nonfarm income, and total household annual income are reported in
Tables 7, 8, and 9.  Note first that the direct marginal effects resulting from mere access to
credit, as well as the indirect marginal effects resulting from exercising the option to
borrow, are not statistically different from zero for all three types of income.  Both
indirect effects resulting from the substitutability between formal and informal sources of
credit are also not statistically different from zero.  As a result, for the average household,
the total marginal effects of access to formal credit on all three types of income, although
positive and quite sizable (+0.5, +2.6, and +0.4 MK, respectively), are not statistically
significantly different from zero.  However, the substitution away from informal sources of
credit, made possible by access to formal credit, has a positive and statistically significant
effect on the annual incomes of credit program members.  
As shown in Tables 6-8, this beneficial substitution effect results from the negative
correlation between borrowing from informal sources and household crop incomes.  The
negative correlation applies also to formal credit.  Hence, it is the mere act of borrowing,
whether from informal or formal sources, that has a negative effect on crop incomes.  In
contrast, both terms of borrowing are positively correlated with nonfarm income.  The
beneficial substitution effect is a mere reflection of the fact that the reduced borrowing
from informal sources makes informal loans play a lesser role in the negative impact that
borrowing in general has on net crop incomes.  The negative correlation between3
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Table 7—Annual income equation (THHINC95): Matrix of direct and indirect partial effects of selected variables
                                                                   Indirect effect through                                                                      
      Direct effect             FLOANMAX            ILOANMAX              FLOANVAL             ILOANVAL         Probability choices        Total effect       
a
Independent Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard EstimatedStandard
variable coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error
CONSTANT -7552.4 46,148.7 -7,552.4 46,148.4
FLOANMAX 1.7125 3.3897 -1.3353 1.7707 0.0563 0.0478 0.4334 2.6699
ILOANMAX 6.0580 8.2932 0.1123 0.2287 -1.1095 0.8735 5.0607 8.0223
FLOANVAL -2.7321 3.5420 -2.7321 3.5420
ILOANVAL -16.3198 11.4295 -16.3198 11.4295
MRFCH 33.6085 23.8320 -26.2067 13.1621 1.1049 0.3705 -207.450 303.9841 -198.94 301.2462
MUDZIH 92.5909 69.5577 -72.1990 35.0980 3.0441 0.9615 26.8553 702.3767 50.2911 692.0499
MUSCOH 57.8117 52.0858 -45.0795 26.2913 1.9006 0.7409 25.5588 549.5803 40.1916 542.3843
PMERW1H 97.2891 71.7075 -75.8626 36.3650 3.1985 1.0093 27.0664 734.7088 51.6915 723.9371
PMERW2H 96.6358 69.2423 -75.3532 34.8965 3.1770 0.9708 27.0366 704.9439 51.4963 694.6686
WMRFC -2,657.6 46,814.3 4,988.4 5,757.6 -3,889.8 3,053.5 164.0 75.1 -1,394.9 45,922.0
WPROG -541.5 47,206.6 5,014.8 5,676.2 -3,910.4 2,995.2 164.8 73.8 727.8 46,361.9
WPAST 395.1 48,921.0 4,778.4 5,757.3 -3,726.0 3,066.4 157.1 73.6 1,604.6 48,159.6
FAINRATT 512.3201 874.0637 -5.7825 63.6319 -28.0907 36.5989 478.4469 846.6599
PVMAIZE 64.0917 202.4048 7.2335 24.0318 -6.1458 23.4056 -18.5904 26.1713 1.3617 4.3108 -1.3801 41.1871 46.5706 192.8925
PPTOB95 156.7981 75.1249 6.6063 18.0323 -4.9574 7.7758 -3.6259 7.8036 1.1060 1.2167 0.8053 15.2987 156.7324 71.2127
LANDAREH 404.4854 242.4733 12.8540 46.1391 36.3444 51.8773 -12.9516 28.2957 -4.0845 5.5917 -1.9882 33.5386 434.6595 218.0339
AGLPAREA 15.2382 14.0111 0.9567 2.4403 -0.4717 1.1602 -0.5302 1.1074 0.4332 0.4342 -0.1826 4.9100 15.4436 11.9138
YYEDUCH 85.5534 76.7510 -1.1642 8.6112 5.2248 10.3604 4.8309 8.1551 -0.5635 2.8733 -0.7670 16.7683 93.1144 75.9134
YYEDUCS 70.3333 69.3534 6.8395 13.7611 1.1490 6.9079 -4.4262 7.2828 -3.2239 2.9348 1.1511 26.8509 71.8228 73.0716
POPADL15 -269.028 256.885 -18.1813 27.2841 -6.0247 16.4731 22.4234 22.7010 5.4210 6.3074 3.7471 161.3987 -261.642 183.623
DEPRATIO -1,224.9 1,144.0 -93.97 161.06 -106.87 151.9 122.99 128.2 20.33 28.3 -4.081 687.3 -1,286.5 739.6
AGEH 10.1027 14.8259 -0.0526 1.9849 -1.4113 2.3429 0.2961 1.2267 0.0101 0.3391 0.1870 2.6957 9.1320 13.8115
MALEHEAD -59.4222 448.5843 -21.4970 72.7531 -26.0527 53.4473 14.6123 38.9072 1.9780 12.0697 -20.2237 118.9042 -110.605 444.2657
R-squared =  0.41
F-stat.(all coefficients): F  = 5.61 (42,334)
F-stat. for the regressors used as instruments in other equations: F  = 1.30 (19,358)
Wu-Hausman Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 193.8 
b
(12)
Durbin Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 240.4
b
(12)
Basmann's Chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions : x  = 18.35
c
(48)
The column of direct effects corresponds to the Two-Stage Least Squares coefficients of the variables included in the equations.
a
Endogenous regressors: FLOANVAL ILOANVAL CINC94 FLOANMAX ILOANMAX MRFC PROG2 DPAST CDWAGE CWMWAGE CFCWAGE WSL12MHH.
b
Instruments: RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND RICHLEND SVLGLEND NGOLEND CDTH3Y CILLAC3Y PHVKM PSVKM NCLWATER
c
NWLSBUY DISTFA DISTPO DISTPSCH DISTTCEN CVGAPYYP.3
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Table 8—Crop income equation (CINC95): Matrix of direct and indirect partial effects of selected variables
                                                                   Indirect effect through                                                                      
      Direct effect             FLOANMAX            ILOANMAX              FLOANVAL             ILOANVAL         Probability choices        Total effect       
a
Independent Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard EstimatedStandard
variable coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error
CONSTANT 5,668.8 21,961.7 5,668.8 21,961.7
FLOANMAX 0.6779 2.3479 -0.1907 1.0624 0.0198 0.0217 0.5071 1.6000
ILOANMAX 5.0084 3.8879 0.0160 0.1262 -0.3908 0.4551 4.6336 3.7975
FLOANVAL -0.3902 2.0713 -0.3902 2.0713
ILOANVAL -5.7479 6.2788 -5.7479 6.2788
MRFCH 13.3050 15.1624 -3.7426 6.8114 0.3892 0.1622 -22.3612 142.6544 -12.4096 141.5905
MUDZIH 36.6549 48.8864 10.3107 21.3958 1.0721 0.4860 -66.4203 345.0853 -39.0040 340.3183
MUSCOH 22.8866 35.8089 -6.4378 15.9929 0.6694 0.3620 -40.8944 268.1098 -23.7762 264.8002
PMERW1H 38.5149 49.8833 10.8339 22.0195 1.1265 0.4999 -70.0143 359.2375 -41.2068 354.6772
PMERW2H 38.2563 48.1147 10.7612 21.1909 1.1190 0.4801 -69.5120 345.6370 -40.8980 341.2637
WMRFC -7,302.4 22,168.6 1,974.8 3,913.5 -555.5 1,751.7 57.7 37.2 -5,825.3 22,048.3
WPROG2 -7,433.4 22,394.0 1,985.2 3,855.1 -558.4 1,724.5 58.0 36.7 -5,948.5 22,304.3
WPAST -8,476.3 23,203.2 1,891.7 3,859.6 -532.1 1,734.5 55.3 36.7 -7,061.4 23,218.8
FAINRATT 58.1004 518.3794 -0.8258 33.3314 -9.8937 15.2258 47.3809 502.6585
PVMAIZE 76.2780 143.4955 2.8636 16.3850 -5.0810 11.0083 -2.6549 15.2518 0.4796 1.9227 5.2557 20.4854 77.1411 140.0515
PPTOB95 123.4684 43.6626 2.6153 12.3857 -4.0985 3.4505 -0.5178 4.8337 0.3895 0.5175 0.0218 6.6558 121.8788 42.5656
LANDAREH 214.4838 113.2434 5.0886 34.2554 30.0473 23.6012 -1.8496 17.2924 -1.4386 1.9758 -1.5037 15.1473 244.8278 98.9608
AGLPAREA 8.4024 6.9292 0.3787 1.6016 -0.3900 0.5142 -0.0757 0.6673 0.1526 0.1973 -0.6359 2.2259 7.8322 5.9261
YYEDUCH 15.8527 38.7768 -0.4609 6.1185 4.3195 5.5861 0.6899 3.6749 -0.1985 1.3882 1.6335 8.4209 21.8363 38.8014
YYEDUCS 49.3381 37.2588 2.7076 10.9516 0.9499 3.3550 -0.6321 4.0275 -1.1355 1.5530 -4.2999 14.1653 46.9281 38.2710
POPADL15 -36.9193 118.9392 -7.1976 18.2925 -4.9808 8.6492 3.2023 13.3346 1.9093 3.3910 -23.8789 74.9911 -67.8650 84.6205
DEPRATIO -200.415 511.1822 -37.2018 107.4407 -88.3569 81.6060 17.5651 76.4544 7.1623 13.9748 -92.4618 295.6435 -393.708 355.6040
AGEH 4.6730 6.8759 -0.0208 1.2978 -1.1668 1.1021 0.0423 0.5890 0.0036 0.1550 0.0886 1.3805 3.6199 6.6046
MALEHEAD 45.0110 213.6800 -8.5102 55.2284 -21.5387 30.3052 2.0868 22.9497 0.6967 5.4566 -10.6262 54.1635 7.1193 210.7278
R-squared =  0.48
F-stat.(all coefficients): F  = 7.31 (42,334)
F-stat. for the regressors used as instruments in other equations: F  = 1.50 (19,358)
Wu-Hausman Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 2,028.6
b
(12)
Durbin Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 2,816.2
b
(12)
Basmann's Chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions : x  = 11.59
c
(48)
The column of direct effects corresponds to the Two-Stage Least Squares coefficients of the variables included in the equations.
a
Endogenous regressors: FLOANVAL ILOANVAL CINC94 FLOANMAX ILOANMAX MRFC PROG2 DPAST CDWAGE CWMWAGE CFCWAGE WSL12MHH.
b
Instruments: RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND RICHLEND SVLGLEND NGOLEND CDTH3Y CILLAC3Y PHVKM PSVKM NCLWATER
c
NWLSBUY DISTFA DISTPO DISTPSCH DISTTCEN CVGAPYYP.3
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Table 9—Nonfarm seasonal income equation (THHNFINC): Matrix of direct and indirect partial effects of selected
variables
                                                                   Indirect effect through                                                                      
      Direct effect             FLOANMAX            ILOANMAX              FLOANVAL             ILOANVAL         Probability choices        Total effect       
a
Independent Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard EstimatedStandard
variable coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error
CONSTANT -2,920.34 19,404.23 -2,920.34 19,404.23
FLOANMAX 0.4578 4.4206 2.2593 3.4814 -0.0780 0.0614 2.6391 3.4024
ILOANMAX -15.7493 13.7246 -0.1899 0.4905 1.5363 1.2431 -14.4030 12.8875
FLOANVAL 4.6226 6.5655 4.6226 6.5655
ILOANVAL 22.5966 15.3214 22.5966 15.3214
MRFCH 8.9848 28.7866 44.3404 25.4182 -1.5299 0.5782 49.2952 72.3267 101.0905 78.9156
MUDZIH 24.7530 90.2768 122.1569 71.4990 -4.2149 1.2827 -68.6763 434.8680 74.0188 427.2315
MUSCOH 15.4553 65.8514 76.2721 52.8271 -2.6317 0.9642 -46.7539 328.8014 42.3418 323.8395
PMERW1H 26.0091 92.0431 128.3554 74.8116 -4.4287 1.3453 071.4548 443.2866 78.4809 435.2255
PMERW2H 25.8344 88.8814 127.4935 72.0223 -4.3990 1.3004 -71.0717 432.9406 77.8572 424.3577
WMRFC 2,747.1 19,535.3 1,333.6 7,360.9 6,581.3 5,930.3 -227.1 105.2 10.435.0 19,857.4
WPROG2 2,134.7 20,080.4 1,340.6 7,257.9 6,616.2 5,818.0 -228.2 102.3 9,863.3 20.271.0
WPAST 3,583.7 18,081.9 1,277.4 7,333.8 6.304.3 5,863.8 -217.5 102.4 10,947.9 18,490.8
FAINRATT -43.7343 519.2909 9.7838109.7342 38.8948 35.5796 4.9442 515.5447
LANDAREH 26.7649 153.0652 3.4364 60.1561 -94.4869 86.9998 21.9135 55.5116 5.6554 5.8953 1.5015 14.6926 -35.2153 138.3163
AGLPAREA -0.5118 5.9193 0.2558 3.0514 1.2264 1.6560 0.8970 2.2990 -0.5998 0.4885 0.1886 1.8153 1.4562 5.6143
YYEDUCH 3.9859 50.3358 -0.3112 9.4988 -13.5832 17.2357 -8.1736 12.4208 0.7802 3.3265 -0.2270 6.6927 -17.5289 46.7126
YYEDUCS 0.8894 27.4321 1.8285 15.8710 -2.9870 15.4920 7.4889 13.2780 4.4638 3.9187 1.1860 9.6979 12.8696 25.5860
POPADL15 96.8778 121.6048 -4.8605 33.1819 15.6628 30.8281 -37.9392 43.4252 -7.5061 7.9216 5.8635 62.9972 68.0982 102.0560
DEPRATIO 331.9313 503.9407 -25.1223 196.6631 277.8476273.5825 -208.103250.7025 -28.156 35.7759 27.524 240.8914 375.921 450.9923
AGEH -0.7393 6.3068 -0.0141 2.0401 3.6690 3.9147 -0.5009 1.5888 -0.0140 0.3952 -0.1179 1.0155 2.2829 4.8413
MALEHEAD -14.5879 229.9565 -5.7470 107.9838 67.7308 79.2852 -24.7233 88.2941 -2.7388 14.9004 5.4384 32.7820 25.3723 174.1397
R-squared =  0.16
F-stat.(all coefficients): F  = 5.13 (40.1090)
F-stat. for the regressors used as instruments in other equations: F  = 0.44 (18,1113)
Wu-Hausman Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 676.4
b
(8)
Durbin Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 695.8
b
(8)
Basmann's Chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions : x  = 12.88
c
(43)
The column of direct effects corresponds to the Two-Stage Least Squares coefficients of the variables included in the equations.
a
Endogenous regressors: FLOANVAL ILOANVAL FLOANMAX ILOANMAX MRFC PROG2 DPAST CINC94.
b
Instruments: RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND RICHLEND SVLGLEND NGOLEND PVOXEN PVCATL PVGSHP PVCHKD.
c40
Note that, as shown in the direct effect columns, the mere access to credit (formal or informal) is
20
positively correlated with crop income (and with nonfarm income).  It is the exercising of the option to borrow
by smallholder farmers that negatively affects their net crop income due to the relatively high input-output
price ratio.
Note that net crop income includes the cost of the inputs acquired through borrowing even if the
21
loans were not repaid.  About 20 percent of the sample households had a negative net crop income for the
1994/95 season.  Furthermore, half of the sample households in one of the district surveyed (Mangochi)
experienced a complete crop failure (no harvest).
borrowing and crop income is not surprising.  Indeed, gross margin calculations using on-
farm trial data from more than 1,600 sites in Malawi have shown that, even in years of
relatively favorable climatic conditions, growing maize (the major crop in Malawi) is
barely profitable due to the very low price of maize compared to the very high price of
fertilizer (Benson 1997; Msukwa et al. 1994).  The very high relative input-output price
ratio, combined with the fact that the 1995 harvest was below average and followed a
severe drought in 1994, explains why, everything else being equal, smallholder farmers
who borrowed to buy inputs experienced lower crop income.   Yet, despite the
20
unprofitability of maize, the formal loan demand equation suggests that, on average, once
they get access to formal credit, most farmers would not restrain themselves from
borrowing.  Moreover, they would respond to higher fertilizer prices by increasing their
demand for formal loans in order to keep the same level of input use (see Diagne 1997). 
This type of behavior from smallholder farmers appears irrational unless they expect debt
forgiveness or intend to default and use the unprofitability of maize as an excuse (see
Msukwa et al. 1994).
21
For the above reasons, the substitution away from informal sources of credit by
credit program members was beneficial for their crop incomes but detrimental for their41
Note that crop income includes nonmarketed crop production valued at market prices.
22
nonfarm incomes.  There were no compensating beneficial effects from the increased
reliance on formal loans.  Consequently, after controlling for all other factors, the incomes
of credit program members are still not statistically significantly different from those of
noncurrent members.  In fact, from the effects of the credit programs—through the
choice-based-corrected conditional probability choices (shown in all table columns labeled
"Probability choices"), which reflect mostly the self-selection and targeted nature of the
programs—one can infer that with or without the direct and indirect effects of access to
formal credit, the incomes of credit program members are not statistically significantly
different from those of noncurrent members.  
Finally, one can see from Table 7 that the two most important determinants of
household annual income are landholding size (LANDAREH, +434.7 MK of additional
income per capita for every additional hectare of land owned) and the producer price of
tobacco (PPTOB95, +156.7 MK of additional income per capita for every MK increase in
the producer price).  Moreover, the significant marginal effects of these two factors on
household income occur as a result of their direct effects on crop income.  The indirect
effects through household access to credit and borrowing are all statistically insignificant.  
In contrast, the price of maize, the major food staple and most important crop in terms of
area planted in Malawi (PVMAIZE), has no statistically significant direct or indirect
effects on household incomes.   This suggests that even higher maize prices will fail to
22
increase crop income in Malawi if the 1994 and 1995 climatic conditions continue to42
prevail and smallholders continue to face a severe land constraint.  Under the current
situation, the adoption of high-value export crops such as tobacco, combined with terms
of trade for these products that are favorable to farmers, is more likely to have a bigger
impact on per capita incomes in Malawi than a continuous heavy reliance on maize, even
with a substantial increase in its producer price.
Marginal Impact of Access to Credit on Household Food Security
Tables 10, 11, and 12 present the results related to the effects of access to formal
credit on household food security.  The tables show several notable findings.  First, access
to formal credit has no statistically significant direct effect on per capita household daily
food expenditure (Table 10).  The indirect effects (through borrowing, substitution, and
income) are also all negligible and statistically insignificant.  The only exception is the
substitution effect for credit program members.  However, when all the direct and indirect
effects are added there are no statistically significant differences in per capita food
expenditure between current and  noncurrent members of the credit program.
Second, neither the direct nor the indirect effects on calorie and protein intake of
the various channels of access to formal credit (substitution, borrowing, income and food
expenditure) are statistically significantly different from zero (Tables 11 and 12).  As a 4
3
Table 10—Daily food expenditure equation (FOODEXC): Matrix of direct and indirect partial effects of selected variables
                                                                                      Indirect effect through                                                                                       
      Direct effect             FLOANMAX            ILOANMAX              FLOANVAL             ILOANVAL              THHINC95           Probability choices       
a
Total effect        
Independent Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard EstimatedStandard Estimated Standard
variable coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error
CONSTANT 5.5174 4.8133 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.5174 4.8133
FLOANMAX -0.0003 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006
ILOANMAX 0.0015 0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 0.0018
FLOANVAL 0.0008 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0014
ILOANVAL -0.0075 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0021 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0095 0.0057
THHINC95 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
MRFCH 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0066 0.0055 0.0000 0.0000 0.0080 0.0050 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0251 0.0480 -0.0532 0.0248 -0.0764 0.0519
MUDZIH 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0183 0.0177 0.0000 0.0000 0.0222 0.0145 0.0014 0.0005 0.0063 0.1137 0.0422 0.0741 0.0538 0.1379
MUSCOH 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0114 0.0134 0.0000 0.0000 0.0138 0.0111 0.0009 0.0004 0.0051 0.0888 0.0286 0.0573 0.0369 0.1077
PMERW1H 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0192 0.0184 0.0000 0.0000 0.0233 0.0152 0.0015 0.0005 0.0065 0.1194 0.0441 0.0766 0.0562 0.1441
PMERW2H 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0191 0.0177 0.0000 0.0000 0.0231 0.0145 0.0015 0.0005 0.0065 0.1142 0.0438 0.0739 0.0558 0.1381
WMRFC 4.0373 4.9635 -0.9856 1.4378 0.0000 0.0000 1.1944 1.1930 0.0752 0.0377 -0.1761 7.6577 0.0000 0.0000 4.1451 8.9539
WPROG2 4.7920 4.9462 -0.9908 1.4225 0.0000 0.0000 1.2007 1.1747 0.0756 0.0373 0.0919 7.7558 0.0000 0.0000 5.1693 9.0173
WPAST 5.9827 5.5650 -0.9441 1.4395 0.0000 0.0000 1.1441 1.1858 0.0720 0.0375 0.2025 8.1027 0.0000 0.0000 6.4572 9.6132
FAINRATT 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0225 -0.0129 0.0187 0.0604 0.1315 0.0000 0.0000 0.0493 0.1314
PVMAIZE -0.0712 0.0903 -0.0014 0.0063 -0.0015 0.0051 0.0057 0.0097 0.0006 0.0028 0.0059 0.0342 -0.0041 0.0041 -0.0660 0.0974
PVCASVA -0.0073 0.0646 0.0014 0.0048 0.0039 0.0050 -0.0019 0.0044 0.0006 0.0023 0.0114 0.0406 0.0000 0.0000 0.0080 0.0755
PVBEANS 0.0734 0.0279 0.0007 0.0018 -0.0025 0.0024 -0.0008 0.0018 0.0010 0.0009 -0.0104 0.0151 0.0000 0.0000 0.0614 0.0334
PVVEGFRT 0.3531 0.0552 -0.0053 0.0134 -0.0040 0.0040 0.0051 0.0098 0.0020 0.0022 0.0158 0.0328 0.0000 0.0000 0.3668 0.0626
PVMEAFSH 0.0113 0.0267 0.0010 0.0036 -0.0018 0.0021 -0.0004 0.0024 0.0013 0.0017 0.0029 0.0206 0.0000 0.0000 0.0143 0.0328
PVDRINK -0.0008 0.0082 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0033 0.0137 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0045 0.0164
LANDAREH 0.1980 0.0699 -0.0025 0.0142 0.0090 0.0086 0.0040 0.0128 -0.0019 0.0032 0.0549 0.0378 0.0004 0.0037 0.2619 0.0755
POPADL15 -0.8131 0.0835 0.0036 0.0075 -0.0015 0.0037 -0.0069 0.0112 0.0025 0.0034 -0.0330 0.0348 0.0172 0.0145 -0.8312 0.0887
DEPRATIO -4.3464 0.5818 0.0186 0.0496 -0.0264 0.0304 -0.0378 0.0659 0.0093 0.0154 -0.1624 0.1464 0.0607 0.0621 -4.4844 0.5951
AGEH 0.0065 0.0068 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 0.0002 0.0012 0.0023 -0.0000 0.0004 0.0072 0.0071
MALEHEAD 0.3692 0.2404 0.0042 0.0211 -0.0064 0.0112 -0.0045 0.0183 0.0009 0.0079 -0.0140 0.0765 0.0002 0.0110 0.3497 0.2554
R-squared =  0.32
F-stat.(all coefficients): F  = 13.64 (37.1093)
F-stat. for the regressors used as instruments in other equations: F  = 1.62 (9,1122)
Wu-Hausman Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 1.80
b
(14)
Durbin Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 1.78
b
(14)
Basmann's Chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions : x  = 59.92
c
(49)
The column of direct effects corresponds to the Ordinary Least Squares coefficients of the variables included in the equations.
a
Endogenous regressors: FLOANVAL ILOANVAL THHINC95 FLOANMAX ILOANMAX MRFC PROG2 DPAST CINC94 FGIFTRV CDWAGE CWMWAGE CFCWAGE SINCS95.
b
Instruments: RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND RICHLEND SVLGLEND NGOLEND FAINRATT PPTOB95 PSTOB95 PCFERT95 PSLMZ95 PSHMZ95 PVOXEN
c
PVCATL PVGSHP PVCHKD NCLWATER NWLSBUY DISTFA DISTPO DISTPSCH DISTTCEN CROPRISK CVG9495P CVGAPYYP.4
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Table 11—Daily calorie intake equation (CALORYC): Matrix of direct and indirect partial effects of selected variables
                                                                                                   Indirect effect through                                                                                                      
      Direct effect             FLOANMAX            ILOANMAX            FLOANVAL           ILOANVAL             THHINC95             FOODEXC        Probability choices      Total effect        
a
Independent Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard
variable coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error
CONSTANT 1,937.02 1,048.45 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1,937.02 1,048.45
FLOANMAX 0.2395 0.1495 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1553 0.1220 0.0049 0.0075 0.0073 0.0641 0.0298 0.1195 0.0000 0.0000 0.1263 0.1870
ILOANMAX -0.0621 0.3900 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0131 0.0200 -0.0974 0.1300 0.0853 0.2685 0.3119 0.3485 0.0000 0.0000 0.2508 0.6678
FLOANVAL -0.3177 0.2640 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0461 0.0932 0.0968 0.2747 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2670 0.4087
ILOANVAL -1.4325 1.9838 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2751 0.3781 -1.8687 1.1223 0.0000 0.0000 -3.5763 2.4391
THHINC95 0.0169 0.0179 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0247 0.0123 0.0000 0.0000 0.0416 0.0198
FOODEXC 195.9134 14.0300 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 195.9134 14.0300
MRFCH 0.0000 0.0000 4.7011 1.1077 0.0000 0.0000 -3.0476 0.9171 0.0970 0.0547 -3.3540 6.7474 -14.9710 10.1916 -7.7437 6.3301 -24.3182 15.8915
MUDZIH 0.0000 0.0000 12.9514 3.7507 0.0000 0.0000 -8.3962 2.8636 0.2672 0.1664 0.8479 18.8042 10.5348 26.7004 -6.8448 18.2449 9.3602 42.8221
MUSCOH 0.0000 0.0000 8.0866 2.8922 0.0000 0.0000 -5.2424 2.1834 0.1668 0.1292 0.6776 15.5823 7.2350 20.8735 -4.2715 14.2540 6.6520 34.3723
PMERW1H 0.0000 0.0000 13.6086 3.9402 0.0000 0.0000 -8.8222 2.9652 0.2808 0.1738 0.8715 19.3594 11.0068 27.9099 -7.1443 18.8800 9.8011 44.5487
PMERW2H 0.0000 0.0000 13.5172 3.8016 0.0000 0.0000 -8.7630 2.8751 0.2789 0.1680 0.8682 18.8562 10.9408 26.7660 -7.1035 18.1871 9.7385 43.0396
WMRFC 753.484 1,117.798 697.7762 263.4124 0.0000 0.0000 -452.355 204.5549 14.3959 12.8061 -23.5174 1,240.646 812.0895 1,743.183 0.0000 0.0000 1,801.873 2,796.261
WPROG2 833.522 1,120.218 701.4679 263.2344 0.0000 0.0000 -454.749 203.2316 14.4720 12.6689 12.2701 1,264.627 1,012.728 1,758.306 0.0000 0.0000 2,119.712 2,822.899
WPAST 1,266.95 1,224.561 668.4025 262.0325 0.0000 0.0000 -433.313 203.0325 13.7899 12.6112 27.0523 1,315.589 1,265.056 1,877.552 0.0000 0.0000 2,807.943 2,997.378
FAINRATT 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6725 7.8214 -2.4657 4.8241 8.0661 24.4193 9.6568 25.4485 0.0000 0.0000 14.5847 44.3950
PVMAIZE -123.422 23.9276 1.0118 1.4970 0.0630 1.0657 -2.1619 1.9707 0.1195 0.6106 0.7851 5.2811 -12.9226 19.0735 -0.8120 1.0546 -137.339 28.3977
PVCASVA -55.8158 14.6715 -0.09893 1.1714 -0.1618 1.0216 0.7331 1.0266 0.1112 0.5387 1.5236 6.8858 1.5715 14.6747 0.0000 0.0000 -53.0276 22.4637
PVBEANS -18.9885 6.7343 -0.4997 0.5172 0.1050 0.6036 0.2942 0.4817 0.1888 0.2801 -1.3924 2.1735 12.0264 6.5578 0.0000 0.0000 -8.2662 10.3826
PVVEGFRT -37.8718 18.0676 3.7612 2.8305 0.1650 1.0234 -1.9387 2.3998 0.3912 0.7650 2.1140 4.4157 71.8666 13.7271 0.0000 0.0000 38.4874 22.0776
PVMEAFSH -6.6562 7.0132 -0.6903 0.7057 0.0734 0.4510 0.1660 0.5270 0.2537 0.4510 0.3861 2.9983 2.7948 6.3651 0.0000 0.0000 -3.6725 10.5964
PVDRINK 4.0941 2.1142 0.1246 0.1526 0.0078 0.0761 -0.0807 0.1282 -0.0434 0.0979 -0.4403 2.0669 -0.8855 3.1757 0.0000 0.0000 2.7766 5.0207
LANDAREH -27.3749 15.8647 1.7980 2.4239 -0.3723 2.3598 -1.5062 2.3434 -0.3585 0.8475 7.3279 8.1515 51.3041 15.6957 0.2077 0.9857 31.0258 23.2492
POPADL15 -167.215 17.3910 -2.5432 1.9017 0.0617 0.6862 2.6077 2.1122 0.4758 0.9755 -4.4110 6.1550 -162.846 20.1677 2.9799 3.3226 -330.890 24.7581
DEPRATIO -811.307 110.3291 -13.1446 9.5763 1.0948 7.3671 14.3035 10.1402 1.7850 4.0843 -21.6899 22.9986 -878.554 130.9740 10.7981 14.9665 -1,696.71 165.8463
AGEH 3.7934 1.7908 -0.0074 0.1412 0.0145 0.1231 0.0344 0.1200 0.0009 0.0483 0.1540 0.4261 1.4198 1.3673 -0.0117 0.0895 5.3979 2.4247
MALEHEAD 21.7985 68.3557 -3.0069 4.9294 0.2669 2.3507 1.6993 4.0974 0.1736 2.1342 -1.8647 12.2920 68.5142 50.3749 -0.1028 2.7056 87.4781 91.4149
R-squared =  0.26
F-stat.(all coefficients): F  = 10.19 (38.1092)
F-stat. for the regressors used as instruments in other equations: F  = 5.03 (9,1122)
Wu-Hausman Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 1.18
b
(15)
Durbin Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 1.85
b
(15)
Basmann's Chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions : x  = 40.97
c
(49)
The column of direct effects corresponds to the Ordinary Least Squares coefficients of the variables included in the equations.
a
Endogenous regressors: FLOANVAL ILOANVAL THHINC95 FOODEXC FLOANMAX ILOANMAX MRFC PROG2 DPAST CINC94 FGIFTRV CDWAGE CWMWAGE CFCWAGE
b
SINCS95.
Instruments: RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND RICHLEND SVLGLEND NGOLEND FAINRATT PPTOB95 PSTOB95 PCFERT95 PSLMZ95 PSHMZ95 PVOXEN
c
PVCATL PVGSHP PVCHKD NCLWATER NWLSBUY DISTFA DISTPO DISTPSCH DISTTCEN CROPRISK CVG9495P CVGAPYYP.4
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Table 12—Daily protein intake equation (PROTEINC): Matrix of direct and indirect partial effects of selected variables
                                                                                                   Indirect effect through                                                                                                      
      Direct effect             FLOANMAX            ILOANMAX            FLOANVAL           ILOANVAL             THHINC95             FOODEXC        Probability choices        Total effect        
a
Independent Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard
variable coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error
CONSTANT -92.4470 166.0262 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -92.4470 166.0262
FLOANMAX 0.1074 0.1318 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0815 0.1040 0.0000 0.0014 -0.0032 0.0171 0.0019 0.0067 0.0000 0.0000 0.0246 0.0483
ILOANMAX -0.1451 0.3020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0069 0.0123 -0.0003 0.0273 -0.0374 0.0523 0.0194 0.0206 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1566 0.2827
FLOANVAL -0.1668 0.1911 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0202 0.0239 0.0060 0.0163 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1406 0.1896
ILOANVAL -0.0048 0.3772 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1206 0.0999 -0.1164 0.0806 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0006 0.3664
THHINC95 -0.0074 0.0052 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0058 0.0050
FOODEXC 12.2026 3.7080 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 12.2026 3.7080
MRFCH 0.0000 0.0000 2.1081 0.9818 0.0000 0.0000 -1.5997 0.7761 0.0003 0.0105 1.4701 1.8854 -0.9325 0.6586 2.0373 1.3134 3.0836 2.0212
MUDZIH 0.0000 0.0000 5.8077 2.4690 0.0000 0.0000 -4.4071 1.8546 0.0009 0.0292 -0.3716 4.2578 0.6562 1.6303 2.4327 3.0374 4.1187 4.7127
MUSCOH 0.0000 0.0000 3.6262 1.8653 0.0000 0.0000 -2.7517 1.3732 0.0006 0.0223 -0.2970 3.2499 0.4506 1.2867 1.4624 2.3773 2.4911 3.6557
PMERW1H 0.0000 0.0000 6.1024 2.5702 0.0000 0.0000 -4.6308 1.8867 0.0009 0.0305 -0.3820 4.4027 0.6856 1.7208 2.5658 3.1390 4.3420 4.8792
PMERW2H 0.0000 0.0000 6.0614 2.4629 0.0000 0.0000 -4.5997 1.8134 0.0009 0.0294 -0.3805 4.2053 0.6815 1.6392 2.5473 3.0391 4.3109 4.6910
WMRFC 209.923 166.9032 312.8968 216.5914 0.0000 0.0000 -237.440 164.5999 0.0485 2.4180 10.3078 291.6821 50.5814 108.1826 0.0000 0.0000 346.3178 323.9520
WPROG2 200.857 164.3553 314.5522 212.8646 0.0000 0.0000 -238.696 161.0225 0.0488 2.3687 -5.3781 293.3134 63.0784 109.2879 0.0000 0.0000 334.4615 322.3594
WPAST 207.591 189.8214 299.7250 217.8854 0.0000 0.0000 -227.445 164.9746 0.0465 2.3653 -11.8572 305.6325 78.7947 116.9142 0.0000 0.0000 346.8549 351.5252
FAINRATT 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3530 2.7272 -0.0083 0.8177 -3.5354 5.8876 0.6015 1.5405 0.0000 0.0000 -3.2952 5.5898
PVMAIZE -4.1229 2.1401 0.4537 1.0392 0.1472 0.6804 -1.1348 1.4873 0.0004 0.0974 -0.3441 1.4950 -0.8049 1.0942 -0.1224 0.1701 -5.9278 2.5010
PVCASVA -4.9982 2.6720 -0.4436 0.7307 -0.3783 0.8718 0.3848 0.5831 0.0004 0.0868 -0.6678 1.4249 0.0979 0.8443 0.0000 0.0000 -6.0049 3.0035
PVBEANS -1.4044 0.8068 -0.2241 0.3538 0.2455 0.5029 0.1544 0.2571 0.0006 0.0491 0.6103 0.6319 0.7491 0.4401 0.0000 0.0000 0.1314 0.8806
PVVEGFRT -2.5892 2.4929 1.6866 2.0296 0.3858 0.8805 -1.0176 1.2112 0.0013 0.1418 -0.9266 1.2943 4.4762 1.6048 0.0000 0.0000 2.0164 2.2130
PVMEAFSH -0.9739 0.7201 -0.3095 0.4051 0.1717 0.3460 0.0871 0.2346 0.0009 0.0838 -0.1692 0.7708 0.1741 0.3838 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0189 1.0014
PVDRINK -0.1183 0.2385 0.0559 0.0995 0.0182 0.0562 -0.0424 0.0671 -0.0001 0.0158 0.1930 0.6127 -0.0552 0.1906 0.0000 0.0000 0.0511 0.5713
LANDAREH 0.9278 2.8644 0.8063 1.6800 -0.8707 1.9410 -0.7906 1.4426 -0.0012 0.1376 -3.2118 2.1744 3.1955 1.3267 0.0465 0.1558 0.1017 1.8728
POPADL15 -5.2861 3.2965 -1.1404 0.9289 0.1443 0.5373 1.3688 1.2657 0.0016 0.1783 1.9334 1.7234 -10.1430 3.1868 0.6054 0.5117 -12.5160 3.1464
DEPRATIO -34.7834 17.0598 -5.8943 6.2932 2.5604 6.0732 7.5079 7.2697 0.0060 0.7371 9.5068 6.7419 -54.7212 17.3090 2.4638 2.2642 -73.3541 15.5035
AGEH 0.1257 0.1949 -0.0033 0.0732 0.0338 0.0904 0.0181 0.0521 0.0000 0.0072 -0.0675 0.0962 0.0884 0.0857 -0.0031 0.0143 0.1921 0.2054
MALEHEAD -4.6434 8.7951 -1.3484 3.5306 0.6241 1.8751 0.8920 2.6718 0.0006 0.3268 0.8173 2.8234 4.2674 3.0297 0.4402 0.4956 1.0498 8.3412
R-squared =  0.21
F-stat.(all coefficients): F  = 7.72 (38.1092)
F-stat. for the regressors used as instruments in other equations: F  = 3.35 (9,1122)
Wu-Hausman Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 16.44
b
(15)
Durbin Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 24.89
b
(15)
Basmann's Chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions : x  = 18.78
c
(49)
The column of direct effects corresponds to the Two-Stage Least Squares coefficients of the variables included in the equations.
a
Endogenous regressors: FLOANVAL ILOANVAL THHINC95 FOODEXC FLOANMAX ILOANMAX MRFC PROG2 DPAST CINC94 FGIFTRV CDWAGE CWMWAGE CFCWAGE
b
SINCS95.
Instruments: RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND RICHLEND SVLGLEND NGOLEND FAINRATT PPTOB95 PSTOB95 PCFERT95 PSLMZ95 PSHMZ95 PVOXEN
c
PVCATL PVGSHP PVCHKD NCLWATER NWLSBUY DISTFA DISTPO DISTPSCH DISTTCEN CROPRISK CVG9495P CVGAPYYP.46
Tables 10-12 show that mere access to formal credit, as measured by the credit limit variable
23
FLOANMAX, has direct positive effects on both calorie and protein intake, although the effects are not
statistically significant.
result, the overall marginal effect of access to formal credit on the food security of the
average household is not statistically significantly different from zero.  However,
everything else being equal, mere access to formal credit has significantly higher effects on
food security for credit program members as compared to noncurrent members.  Likewise,
the substitution away from informal sources of credit appears to significantly improve the
protein intake of credit program members as compared to noncurrent members.   But,
when credit program members exercise the option to borrow from the formal sector, they
end up being significantly worse off.  Again, as with income, the mere act of borrowing
(not just from formal sources) is negatively correlated with both calorie and protein intake. 
This explains why the reduction in borrowing from informal sources has a positive impact
on household food security, while increased borrowing from formal sources has the
opposite effect.   When all the direct and indirect effects of membership in credit
23
programs are added (including the effects of self-selection and targeted nature of the
programs), there appear to be no statistically significant differences between the level of
food security of credit program members and that of noncurrent members.  There are two
possible explanations for the negative correlation between borrowing and food security as
measured by calorie and protein intake.  The first explanation arises from the negative
correlation between borrowing and crop income.  Everything else being equal, this
negative correlation should lead to lower calorie intake, especially if smallholders have to
repay the loan.  The second possible explanation is that if the loan granted is not enough47
for the intended investment, the household may reduce food consumption in order to make
up for the shortfall.
Third, Tables 11 and 12 show that, as expected, the most important determinant of
household food security is per capita daily food expenditure (FOODEXC, 195.9 and 12.2
for calorie and protein intakes, respectively).  Once daily per capita food expenditure is
controlled for, the only other variables with important and statistically significant overall
effects on per capita daily calorie and protein intakes are the price of maize (PVMAIZE,
–137 and –5.9, respectively) and the price of cassava (PVCASVA, –53 and –6,
respectively).  Furthermore, these negative effects of maize and cassava prices are due
mostly to their direct negative impact on both daily calorie and protein intakes.  The
indirect effects through the various channels (access to credit, borrowing, income, and
food expenditure) are not statistically different from zero.  Maize and cassava are the two
most important food staples in Malawi and together they occupy more than 80 percent of
the country’s cultivated land.  Therefore, because of the nonseparability between the food
consumption and production decisions of agricultural households (Singh, Squire, and
Strauss 1986), one should expect maize and cassava prices to have direct effects on
calorie and protein intakes in addition to their indirect effects through the household food
budget.  The prices of beans (PVBEANS) and vegetables and fruits (PVVGFRT) also
have statistically significant direct negative effects on calorie and protein intakes for
similar reasons.  For the same inseparability reasons, total household income should also
have a direct positive effect on both calorie and protein intakes.  However, only its indirect
effects through the household food budget are statistically significant.  Furthermore, its48
overall total effect is statistically significant only for calorie intake.  Finally, a larger
household adult population size and higher dependency ratios have negative and
statistically significant effects on household food security.
Marginal Effect of Access to Credit on the Nutritional Status of Children
The effects of access to formal credit on the nutritional status of preschoolers, as
measured by their weight-for-age and height-for-age Z-scores, are presented in Tables 13
and 14.  The weight-for-age Z-score measures short-term or acute malnutrition, while the
height-for-age Z-score measures chronic malnutrition.  The results are broadly in
agreement with the ones for food security, except for a few exceptions:  for both measures
of malnutrition, the direct and indirect effects of access to formal credit are not statistically
significantly different from zero for preschoolers living in the average household. 
However, everything else being equal, mere access to formal credit appears to induce
statistically significant positive effects (the more positive the better) on the nutrition of
preschoolers in credit program member households as compared to those in noncurrent
member households.  (The only exceptions are MRFC member households.)  When the
option to borrow is exercised, preschoolers in credit program member households (except
the ones in MRFC households) end up having significantly worse chronic malnutrition,
compared to those in noncurrent member households.  Furthermore, 4
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Table 13—Weight-for-age equation (WFAGEZ): Matrix of direct and indirect partial effects of selected variables
                                                                                                              Indirect effect through                                                                                                                 
   Direct effect       FLOANMAX      ILOANMAX     FLOANVAL      ILOANVAL         THHINC95            CalorieC            PORTEINC      Probability choices       Total effect       
a
Independent Est. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard Esti. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard
variable coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error
CONSTANT -1.1854 8.7565 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -1.1854 8.7565
FLOANMAX -0.0022 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0034 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024 0.0025
ILOANMAX -0.0108 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0018 0.0015 0.0008 0.0023 0.0000 0.0005 0.0004 0.,0047 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0077 0.0086
FLOANVAL -0.0002 0.0070 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0076
ILOANVAL 0.0264 0.0201 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0027 0.0034 -0.0002 0.0030 0.0000 0.0049 0.0000 0.0000 0.0236 0.0196
THHINC95 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002
CalorieC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0096 0.1377 -0.0292 0.1463 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0196 0.0944
PROTEINC 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007
MRFCH -0.0024 0.0129 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0024 0.0129
MUDZIH 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0435 0.0274 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0020 0.0247 -0.0018 0.0005 -0.0324 0.0606 -0.0012 0.0144 -0.0074 0.0282 -0.0225 0.0572 -0.1108 0.0900
MUSCOH 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1199 0.0818 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0056 0.0691 -0.0049 0.0016 0.0082 0.1549 0.0005 0.0295 -0.0099 0.0768 0.0298 0.1392 -0.1018 0.1951
PMERW1H 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0749 0.0652 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0035 0.0550 -0.0031 0.0012 0.0065 0.1250 0.0003 0.0232 -0.0060 0.0603 0.0199 0.1118 -0.0607 0.1570
PMERW2H 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1260 0.0867 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0059 0.0732 -0.0052 0.0016 0.0084 0.1614 0.0005 0.0304 -0.0104 0.0789 0.0312 0.1454 -0.1074 0.2024
WMRFC 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1251 0.0831 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0058 0.0701 -0.0051 0.0016 0.0084 0.1556 0.0005 0.0293 -0.0103 0.0762 0.0310 0.1403 -0.1066 0.1953
WPROG2 1.2571 8.6045 -6.4594 6.8822 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3018 5.9161 -0.2656 0.1182 -0.2270 10.2426 0.0883 2.0823 -0.8296 5.3243 0.0000 0.0000 -6.7380 13.6900
WPAST 1.5854 8.5201 -6.4936 6.7912 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3034 5.8175 -0.2670 0.1172 0.1185 10.4367 0.1039 2.2038 -0.8012 5.2976 0.0000 0.0000 -6.0574 13.7584
1.7396 9.1971 -6.1875 6.8691 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2891 5.9042 -0.2544 0.1166 0.2612 10.9360 0.1377 2.5604 -0.8309 5.6527 0.0000 0.0000 -5.4235 15.0258
R-squared =  0.13
F-stat.(all coefficients): F  = 2.34 (38.579)
Wu-Hausman Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 29.65
b
(19)
Durbin Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 29.95
b
(19)
Basmann's Chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions : x  = 24.66
c
(51)
Note: Est. coeffi. = estimated coefficient.
The column of direct effects corresponds to the Two-Stage Least Squares coefficients of the variables included in the equations.
a
Endogenous regressors: FLOANVAL ILOANVAL THHINC95 CALORYC PROTEINC FLOANMAX ILOANMAX MRFC PROG2 DPAST CINC94 FGIFTRV CDWAGE CWMWAGE CFCWAGE SINCS95 CDTH3Y
b
CILLAC3Y WSL12MHH.
Instruments: PVMAIZE PVCASVA PVBEANS PVVEGFRT PVMEAFSH PVDRINK PVOTHER RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND RICHLEND SVLGLEND NGOLEND FAINRATT PPTOB95
c
PSTOB95 PCFERT95 PSLMZ95 PSHMZ95 PVOXEN PVCATL PVGSHP PVCHKD NWLSBUY DISTFA DISTPO DISTPSCH DISTTCEN CROPRISK CVG9495P CVGAPYYP.5
0
Table 14—Height-for-age equation (HFAGEZ): Matrix of direct and indirect partial effects of selected variables
                                                                                                              Indirect effect through                                                                                                                 
   Direct effect       FLOANMAX      ILOANMAX     FLOANVAL      ILOANVAL         THHINC95            CalorieC            PORTEINC      Probability choices       Total effect       
a
Independent Est. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard Esti. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard Est. Standard
variable coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error coeffi. error
CONSTANT -19.6124 12.0794 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -19.6124 12.0794
FLOANMAX 0.0088 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0086 0.0054 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0009 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033
ILOANMAX 0.0114 0.0106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0016 0.0002 0.0031 0.0005 0.0009 0.0035 0.0066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0158 0.0118
FLOANVAL -0.0175 0.0109 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0014 -0.0006 0.0005 0.0031 0.0042 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0150 0.0118
ILOANVAL -0.0084 0.0227 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0058 -0.0074 0.0056 0.0000 0.0087 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0164 0.0228
THHINC95 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003
CalorieC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4059 0.2185 -0.2726 0.2119 0.0000 0.0000 0.1334 0.1433
PROTEINC 0.0021 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.0011
MRFCH -0.0223 0.0185 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0223 0.0185
MUDZIH 0.0000 0.0000 0.1726 0.0387 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1680 0.0332 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0083 0.1037 -0.0504 0.0258 -0.0689 0.0438 0.0448 0.0827 -0.0777 0.1304
MUSCOH 0.0000 0.0000 0.4754 0.1392 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4629 0.1191 0.0016 0.0015 0.0021 0.2056 0.0194 0.0456 -0.0920 0.1227 0.0432 0.1933 -0.0133 0.2852
PMERW1H 0.0000 0.0000 0.2968 0.1079 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2890 0.0912 0.0010 0.0012 0.0017 0.1628 0.0138 0.0364 -0.0556 0.0945 0.0228 0.1528 -0.0087 0.2279
PMERW2H 0.0000 0.0000 0.4995 0.1474 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4864 0.1262 0.0016 0.0016 0.0021 0.2155 0.0203 0.0472 -0.0970 0.1274 0.0464 0.1996 -0.0134 0.2972
WMRFC 0.0000 0.0000 0.4961 0.1414 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4831 0.1210 0.0016 0.0016 0.0021 0.2063 0.0202 0.0458 -0.0963 0.1232 0.0459 0.1931 -0.0134 0.2858
WPROG2 14.7045 11.8173 25.6118 10.9543 0.0000 0.0000 -24.9390 9.4233 0.0839 0.1287 -0.0579 15.4291 3.7335 3.5840 -7.7360 8.7209 0.0000 0.0000 11.4008 18.7896
WPAST 14.5745 11.5263 25.7473 10.8101 0.0000 0.0000 -25.0709 9.2941 0.0844 0.1263 0.0302 15.3982 4.3920 3.7925 -7.4711 8.7532 0.0000 0.0000 12.2864 18.7082
17.7437 12.6775 24.5336 10.7491 0.0000 0.0000 -23.8891 9.2587 0.0804 0.1272 0.0666 16.3630 5.8180 4.4831 -7.7480 9.3107 0.0000 0.0000 16.6053 20.3844
R-squared =  0.11
F-stat.(all coefficients): F  = 1.90 (38.579)
Wu-Hausman Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 225.50
b
(19)
Durbin Chi-squared statistics for exogeneity : x  = 326.03
b
(19)
Basmann's Chi-squared statistics for the overidentifying restrictions : x  = 33.58
c
(51)
Note:  Est. coeffi. = estimated coefficient.
The column of direct effects corresponds to the Two-Stage Least Squares coefficients of the variables included in the equations.
a
Endogenous regressors: FLOANVAL ILOANVAL THHINC95 CALORYC PROTEINC FLOANMAX ILOANMAX MRFC PROG2 DPAST CINC94 FGIFTRV CDWAGE CWMWAGE CFCWAGE SINCS95 CDTH3Y
b
CILLAC3Y WSL12MHH.
Instruments: PVMAIZE PVCASVA PVBEANS PVVEGFRT PVMEAFSH PVDRINK PVOTHER RELALEND SHTRADEL FARMLEND MALELEND RICHLEND SVLGLEND NGOLEND FAINRATT PPTOB95
c
PSTOB95 PCFERT95 PSLMZ95 PSHMZ95 PVOXEN PVCATL PVGSHP PVCHKD NWLSBUY DISTFA DISTPO DISTPSCH DISTTCEN CROPRISK CVG9495P CVGAPYYP.51
However, given the reduced form nature of the estimated equations, one must be cautious with the
24
causal interpretations given here.  The negative correlation can be consistent with households borrowing more
to take care of their children, when the nutritional status of the children is deteriorating.
because of the positive correlation between informal borrowing and short-term nutrition
levels, credit program members’ substitution away from informal credit leads to a
significant deterioration in the short-term nutritional status of their preschoolers,
compared to the status of noncurrent member households.   Finally, as with food security,
24
when all the direct and indirect effects of membership in credit programs are added
(including the effects of self-selection and the targeted nature of the programs), there
appears to be no statistically significant differences in the acute and chronic malnutrition of
preschoolers in credit program member and noncurrent member households.
5.  CONCLUSION
The estimated marginal effects of either the amount of credit received or
membership in a credit program are not valid measures of the effect of access to credit on
household welfare.  This paper has shown how the concept of maximum credit provides
an alternative and more satisfactory framework for measuring the impact of access to
credit.  Various direct and indirect effects on household incomes, food security, and
nutritional status of preschoolers have been estimated by applying the maximum credit
framework to data collected in Malawi.  The main findings show that, while access to
formal credit enables households to reduce their borrowing from informal sources and
thereby experience marginally beneficial effects on household annual income, these effects
are too small to cause any significant difference between the per capita incomes, food52
The average length of membership at the time of the survey was less than 3 years.
25
security, and nutritional status of credit program members and those of noncurrent
members.  Furthermore, this beneficial substitution effect reflects only the fact that
reduced borrowing from informal sources makes informal loans play a lesser role in the
negative effect that borrowing (from formal or informal sources) has on net crop incomes. 
The marginal effects on household farm and nonfarm incomes that result from mere access
to formal credit are positive and quite sizable, but not statistically significantly different
from zero.
That credit program members have not yet benefitted from access to formal credit
may be due to the fact that they have not been members for a long enough period.   The
25
below-average 1995 harvest that followed a severe drought in 1994 should also be kept in
mind.  However, the most likely cause of the lack of positive effect of access to formal
credit on household welfare is the unfavorable terms of trade for the farm products of
smallholders.  Indeed, gross margin calculations using on-farm trial data have shown that
even in relatively favorable climatic conditions, growing maize is barely profitable due to
the very low relative price of maize and fertilizer (Benson 1997; and Msukwa et al. 1994). 
In fact, according to Benson (1997, 14), “...under current prices the use of fertilizer on
hybrid maize in Malawi cannot be recommended for virtually all of the country.”  Yet,
despite the unprofitability of maize, the formal loan demand equation suggests that, on
average, once they get access to formal credit, most farmers would not restrain themselves
from borrowing.  However, the finding that the price of tobacco has a significant and53
The average household size in the sample is 5.
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much bigger impact on income than the price of maize, suggests that, instead of maize,
farmers should be devoting more of their scarce resources to tobacco if they want to see a
significant increase in their incomes. 
Land scarcity remains the most constraining factor for increasing per capita
household incomes in Malawi.  Access to formal credit may not have had positive effects
because of the severe land constraint.  The main conclusion drawn from this analysis is
that the necessary complementary resources and economic environment are not yet in
place for access to formal credit to realize its full potential benefits for Malawi’s rural
population.  Therefore, policy reforms should emphasize a more equitable land distribution
to ease the land constraints facing smallholder farmers, and should encourage an efficient
and sustainable use of existing cultivable land.  However, one must recognize the possible
limitation of land reforms in alleviating the land constraint.  More than 80 percent of the
cultivable land in Malawi is already being farmed under the customary tenure system by
smallholder households with an average landholding of 1.1 hectares.  Furthermore, 55
percent of these farms are less than 1 hectare each and 95 percent are less than 3 hectares
(World Bank 1987).   Therefore, it is doubtful that land reform can significantly alleviate
26
the land constraint facing the smallholder, because reform would be limited to the
remaining 20 percent of cultivable land in the hands of large estate holders.  Given the
limited scope for land reform, policy reforms should put more emphasis on promoting the
adoption of high-value export crops such as tobacco, and work toward terms of trade for54
these products that are favorable to farmers.  Such policy reforms are more likely to have
a bigger effect on rural poverty and food insecurity in Malawi than a continuous heavy


















Correcting for the Effects of Choice-Based Sampling
To consistently estimate the parameters of any of the equations ([1] through [5]) in
the system, one needs to derive the probability density and conditional means of the
distribution of y|x under choice-based sampling.  Although the case treated in the literature
on estimation under choice-based sampling occurs when the same dependent variable y is
used as a stratifying variable (Manski and McFadden 1981; Amemiya 1985; Hausman and
Wise 1981; Cosslett 1981, 1993), the same method can be used to derive consistent
estimators of the population parameters when the endogenous stratifying variable is other
than y (the membership status variable in this case).  If j=1,...,J indexes are the J
alternative choices defining the strata, then under choice-based sampling, the conditional







































If we define the choice-based-corrected conditional probability choices as
then the conditional mean of y|x under choice-based sampling can be written as a weighted
sum of the population conditional means  , where the weights are precisely the
choice-based-corrected conditional probability choices.  That is:
Because the population ratios in this study, Q(j), j=1,...,J, are known (they are
obtained from the village census done prior to the survey), one can use equation (9) to
jointly and consistently estimate, by maximum likelihood methods, the population
parameters of the distribution of y|x,j and the conditional probability choices (after
specifying a multinomial probit or logit model for  ).  Except for the additional terms
involving the conditional density of y|x,j, the likelihood function resulting from equationp(j|x)
E(y|x,j) ’ "x % $jz(j) j’1,...,J ,






The Manski-McFadden estimator estimates the population parameters of the conditional probability
28
choices  .
For the sake of simplicity, equation (13) does not take into account the additional terms arising from
29
the possible simultaneity of some of the regressors in x and z(j).
(13)
(14)
(9) is the same as the one for the Manski-McFadden (1981) choice-based sampling
estimator (see also Amemiya 1985, 330).   However, as described in this paper, a two-
28
stage estimation method similar to Heckman’s two-step procedure for Tobit models is
used here.
The explicit form of equation (12) from equations (1) through (5) is derived by
writing the population conditional means   as
where z(j) is a vector of alternative-specific regressors and " and $ are the parameters to j
be estimated.   Hence, equation (12) becomes
29
Because the alternative-specific regressors in the system (equations [1] through [5]) are
comprised only of the credit program dummy variables, equation (14) can be further
simplified.  Indeed, let (D ,...,D ) be the J dimensional vector of program dummies 1 J
corresponding to the mutually exclusive J alternative choices defining the strata. Also, let$jzi(j) ’ j
J&1
k’1
$kDk(ji) with Dk(ji)’1 if ji’k and 0 otherwise .






$kDk(ji) ’"xi % j
J&1
j’1





Again, as noted in footnote 29, equation (16) does not take into account the additional terms arising
30
from the possible simultaneity of some of the regressors in x and z(j).
(15)
(16)
j designate the stratum or alternative choice of the i  household.  Then, for the i i
th           th
household, we have the following, after dropping one of the (redundant) dummy variables:
Hence, the sample analogue of equation (14) can be written as 
As claimed in this paper, equation (16) shows that the choice-based sampling
correction concerns only the equations where the program dummies appear as regressors
and the correction consists simply of replacing the program dummies by the corresponding
consistently estimated choice-based-corrected conditional probability choices.   Of
30
course, the estimated $ parameters have to be interpreted accordingly. j59
APPENDIX 2
Definition and summary statistics of variables used in the model
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum N Label
AGEH 45.82 13.76 20.0 86.0 1,885 Age of head of household
AGLPAREA 81.35 19.02 0 100 1,885 Percent of share of household agricultural land out
of total land
CALORYC 2,056.38 951.92 241.18 9,654.11 1,885 Per capita daily calorie intake
CDTH3Y .26 .45 0 2 1,885 Number of deaths in household within last 3 years
CDWAGE .11 .31 0 1 1,885 1 = Has a daily wage contract
CFCWAGE .09 .29 0 1 1,885 1 = Has a fixed work contract
CILLAC3Y .18 .52 0 5 1,885 Number of illnesses/accidents in household in last 3
years
CINC94 192.89 440.67 -324 4,864 1,885 Total household net crop income (1994, MK)
CINC95 571.79 1,089.60 -161 10,985 1,885 Total household net crop income (1995, MK)
CPVENT3Y .51 .89 .00 8.00 1,885 Number of positive events in household in last 3
years
CROPRISK 7.78 1.53 5 10 1,885 Index of crop risk 1 to 9
CVG9495P 1.24 .34 .85 2.03 1,885 1994/95 gaps within-peak season coefficient of
variable
CVGAPYYP .30 .06 .20 .45 1,885 Coefficient of variable across years of days of gaps
(no rain)
CWMWAGE .12 .33 0 1 1,885 1 = Has a weekly/monthly wage contract
DEPRATIO .49 .22 .00 1.00 1,885 Dependency ratio: (population < 15 and > 64)
DISTFA 2.33 3.75 .00 15.00 1,885 Distance to Field Assistant's/Community
Development Assistant's home
DISTPO 6.64 7.70 .00 26.00 1,885 Distance to post office
DISTPSCH 1.65 1.76 .00 5.00 1,885 Distance to primary school
DISTTCEN 5.04 5.16 .00 15.00 1,885 Distance to trading center
DISTUND5 3.72 3.46 .00 19 1,885 Distance from house to under-five clinic
DP9495 .60 .49 .00 1.00 1,885 1 = 1994/1995 data
DPASTMH .24 .43 0 1 1,885 1 = Household is a past member of a credit program
EXPNFDC 20.77 38.49 .00 413.36 1,885 Per capita monthly nonfood expenditure
FAINRATT .34 .20 .00 2.96 1,885 Transaction cost-adjusted formal interest rate
FAMTSTD 13.02 52.90 -145 846 1,885 MK outstanding on previous period formal loan
FARMERSV .38 .49 0 1 1,508 1 = Saving keeper is a simple farmer
FARMLEND .05 .22 0 1 1,885 1 = Lender is a simple farmer
FGIFTRV 4.21 22.10 0 417 1,508 MK value of NGO gifts received by household
FLOANMAX 70.50 172.91 0 2600 1,603 Maximum formal credit limit
FLOANVAL 30.75 110.09 0 2256 1,885 MK value of formal loans received
FNOCLCND .06 .23 .00 1.00 1,885 1 = No condition on the formal loan
FOODEXC 3.96 3.00 .30 23.68 1,885 Per capita MK value household food consumption
FPDEFLT .09 .29 0 1 1,885 1 = Has defaulted on past formal loans
FWEEKDLY 1.37 2.32 .00 26.00 1,885 Formal loan weeks of delay before receipt
HFAGEZ -1.96 1.68 -7.71 4.45 1,046 Average height-for-age Z-score of under-6
IAMTSTD .45 5.47 -4 100 1,885 MK outstanding on previous period  informal loan
IDUEDATE .26 .44 0 1 1,885 1 = Informal loan with fixed due date
ILLACCDN .19 .49 0 4 1,885 Number of illnesses/accidents in household
ILOANMAX 25.14 49.39 0 743 1,511 Maximum informal credit limit
ILOANVAL 2.23 11.51 0 200 1,885 MK value of informal loans received
INOCLCND .07 .25 0 1 1,885 1 = No condition on the informal loan
IWEEKDLY .06 .28 .00 4.70 1,885 Informal loan weeks of delay before receipt
LANDAREH 1.96 1.41 .1 13 1,885 Total hectares of household land
LATRINE .81 .39 0 1 1,885 1 = Has latrine
LCGIFTG 4.01 24.52 0 720 1,508 One period lag of cumulative gifts given




Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum N Label
LDAOWNS .43 .47 .00 1.00 1,885 Share of acres of household land owned by spouse
LDPASSTH .51 .25 .0 1.0 1,885 Share of value of household assets held as land
LVPASSTH .13 .20 .0 1.0 1,885 Share of value of household assets in livestock
MALEHEAD .72 .45 0 1 1,885 1 = Male-headed household
MALELEND .09 .29 0 1 1,885 1 = Lender is a male
MALESAVE .38 .48 0 1 1,508 1 = Saving keeper is a male
MRFCH .22 .42 0 1 1,885 1 = Household is a current member of MRFC
MUDZIH .07 .25 0 1 1,885 1 = Household is a current member of MUDZI
FUND
MUSCOH .07 .26 0 1 1,885 1 = Household is a current member of MUSCCO
NCLWATER .38 .48 0 1 1,885 1 = No access to clean water
NGOLEND .01 .11 0 1 1,885 1 = Lender is a credit club member
NWLSBUY .98 1.22 .00 4.00 1,885 Number of wholesale buyers coming to village
PCFERT95 2.13 .84 .94 6.67 1,885 1995 chemical fertilizer price (MK/kg)
PDASOWNS .40 .46 .00 1.00 1,885 Share of value of household productive asset
PEVENTN .41 .82 .00 8.00 1,885 Number of positive events in household
PHVKM 30.03 94.01 0 700 1,885 Distance from village of parents of head
PMERW1H .16 .36 0 1 1,885 1 = Household is a current member of PMERW1
PMERW2H .09 .29 0 1 1,885 1 = Household is a current member of PMERW2
POPADL15 2.56 1.26 0 8 1,885 Adult household members between 15 and 64
PPTOB95 12.17 3.98 2.00 30.00 1,885 1995 tobacco producer price (MK/kg)
PROTEINC 80.73 60.31 6.08 751.67 1,885 Per capita protein intake 
PSHMZ95 3.88 1.36 .70 7.00 1,885 1995 hybrid maize seed price (MK/kg)
PSLMZ95 16.97 105.63 .33 2000.00 1,885 1995 local maize seed price (MK/kg)
PSTOB95 1.40 .41 .12 4.50 1,885 1995 tobacco seed price (MK/g)
PSVKM 26.55 77.20 0 600 1,885 Distance from village of parents of spouse
PVBEANS 8.12 2.86 3.70 25.00 1,885 Village consumer (weighted) price of bean
PVCASVA 2.78 1.51 .55 6.45 1,885 Village consumer (weighted) price of cassava
PVCATL 776.77 474.93 95 3000 1,885 Village-level (weighted) prices of cattle
PVCHKD 223.77 728.19 5 5106 1,885 Village-level (weighted) prices of chicken
PVDRINK 12.45 10.24 2.08 53.60 1,885 Village consumer (weighted) price of drink
PVGSHP 87.50 37.13 26 255 1,885 Village-level (weighted) prices of goats
PVMAIZE 1.52 .95 .08 6.16 1,885 Village consumer (weighted) price of maize
PVMEAFSH 8.37 3.07 .73 16.01 1,885 Village consumer (weighted) price meat/fish
PVOTHER 6.09 4.25 .24 19.79 1,885 Village consumer (weighted) price of other
PVOXEN 1,787.71 485.29 450 3000 1,885 Village-level (weighted) prices of oxen
PVVEGFRT 2.21 .94 .11 6.89 1,885 Village consumer (weighted) price of vegetables
RELALEND .06 .23 0 1 1,885 1 = Lender is a relative of borrower
RICHLEND .08 .27 0 1 1,885 1 = Lender is richer than borrower
RISKSTOR 2.01 .52 1 3 1,885 1 = Severe crop storage loss
SHTRADEL .04 .21 0 1 1,885 1 = Lender is a shopkeeper or trader
SINCS95 .76 3.82 .0 67 1,885 Share of spouse cash income in 1995
SOUTH .24 .43 0 1 1,885 1 = Southern region
SVLGLEND .09 .29 0 1 1,885 1 = Lender lives in same village as borrower
TASSETVH 2,111.13 4,187.78 130 79991 1,885 MK total value of all assets owned by household
TCONSC 139.75 105.62 10.15 762.77 1,885 Per capita monthly food and nonfood expenses
THHINC95 1,187.84 1,549.13 -29 13413 1,885 Total household income in the 1994/95 season
THHNFINC 227.31 511.27 0 6154 1,885 Total household nonfarm-seasonal income
VPOORER .20 .40 .00 1.00 1,885 1 = Village is poorer than neighboring village
WFAGEZ -.85 1.32 -4.91 12.17 1,046 Average weight-for-age Z-score of under-6
WFHEIZ .17 1.16 -3.62 3.79 1,046 Average weight-for-height Z-score of under-6
WSL12MHH 1.01 1.92 .00 17.33 1,885 Average weeks of sickness in last 12 months in
household
YYEDUCH 4.20 3.32 .00 12.00 1,885 Years of schooling of head
YYEDUCS 3.14 3.05 .00 10.00 1,885 Years of schooling of spouse61
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